

Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

NOVEMBER, 1972

INDIA AND SOUTH ASIA

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Coming Next Month

SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1972

Our December, 1972, issue will focus on the nations of Southeast Asia and United States policy there. What are the prospects for an end to the war in Indochina? How strong are the Southeast Asian nations? What about United States policy? Articles will include:

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Current History

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In this issue, we turn to the problems of the nations of South Asia, and United States policies in that region of the world. Unfortunately, as our introductory article points out, in recent years "the United States has shown a decreasing interest in South Asia, and the influence and prestige of the United States . . . have declined markedly." What the United States needs today is "a fundamental reappraisal and reorientation of its South Asian policies. . . ."

The United States and the New Order in Asia

BY NORMAN D. PALMER

*Professor of Political Science and South Asian Studies,
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SOUTH ASIA WAS ONE of the world's crisis areas in 1971-1972. Fundamental changes occurred in all the countries of the area, in the order of power in the subcontinent, and in the position of India and Pakistan in Asia and in the international system.¹ A new nation—Bangladesh—emerged in what had been East Pakistan, after a bloody civil war, the exodus of millions of East Bengalis into India, and Indian military intervention. With some 70 million people, Bangladesh is, demographically speaking, the eighth largest nation in the world. She has made a brave start, with substantial assistance from India and other countries and international agencies in her efforts for national survival and development, under a charismatic leader, Sheik Mujibur Rahman; but she is one of the poorest and most crowded nations in the world, and she faces a staggering number of economic, social and political problems.

The nation of Pakistan, in the form in which it existed for nearly 25 years, has disintegrated. What is left, formerly West Pakistan, with about 55 million people, is attempting to find a new identity and legitimacy, under a mercurial but dynamic leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The government of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike in Ceylon, returned with a solid majority

in the general election of May, 1970, is experiencing increasing economic and financial difficulties; and the problem of internal instability has been a serious one ever since the uprising of young "Che Guevarists" in April, 1971. Nepal, wedged between China and India, and Bhutan, just emerging into the international system, are controlled systems under new kings.

India, after an unprecedented period of political instability, with coalition governments in many of the states, following the fourth general elections in 1967, gave Mrs. Indira Gandhi and her new Congress party an impressive mandate in the fifth general elections in 1971. She seemed to be in for a period of greater political stability and real economic and social change, under a strong, determined and popularly backed leader. The strength of the government and the nation was severely tested as a result of the crisis in East Pakistan in 1971. But Mrs. Gandhi won widespread support for the manner in which she dealt with the refugee problem and other problems caused by the civil war in Pakistan, for the way in which she persevered in spite of strong external pressures, and for her leadership in the Indo-Pakistani war of December, 1971. India emerged from the ordeal in a more self-confident and self-reliant mood, and in a position of greater dominance in South Asia and of greater reputation and influence in Asian, and perhaps also in world affairs.

¹ See Norman D. Palmer, "The New Order in South Asia," *Orbis*, XV (Winter, 1972).

Three major powers—the United States, the Soviet Union and China—were involved in the South Asian crisis, and the outcome affected their positions in the area and to some extent their mutual relations. Only the Soviet Union seemed to be in tune with the changing scene in South Asia. By backing India and eventually supporting the struggle in East Pakistan, it was on the winning side in the crisis. Both the United States and the People's Republic of China gave limited support to Pakistan, even during the months of repression in East Pakistan and the war with India.

The greatest loser among the major powers seemed to be the United States. By its relative neglect of South Asia, its failure to understand the nature of the forces at work in that part of the world, its "tilt toward Pakistan," its recurrent criticisms of Indian policies and its anti-Indian moves, and its failure to speak out officially against the brutalities of Pakistani troops in East Pakistan and to support the cause of Bangladesh, it alienated India and the new nation of Bangladesh. Because of its limited support, it did not even win widespread support in Pakistan. Its position and policies were severely criticized in many countries, and by articulate groups in the United States itself. In his 1972 foreign affairs message to Congress, President Richard Nixon stated that the United States had "made a determined year-long effort to prevent a war" in South Asia, and he listed the unsuccessful effort among the "sharp disappointments" of 1971. Critics of his South Asian policy would be more inclined to subscribe to the verdict of Max Ways that "Leaving aside the endlessly debatable questions of Vietnam policy, the Nixon handling of the conflict over Bangladesh was the worst of the very few real foreign policy mistakes of his Administration."²

DECLINING U.S. ROLE

Since the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, and the Tashkent Conference of the following January, the United States has shown a decreasing interest in South Asia, and the influence and prestige of the United States in that part of the world have declined markedly, at a time when Soviet influence and activity have increased. Military aid to India and Pakistan was suspended when the two unfriendly neighbors went to war in 1965, and has not been resumed, except on a very limited basis in the case of Pakistan. But even this limited relaxation of the ban on military aid has been a major factor in growing Indian resentment against the United States, especially since 1970. Economic aid, temporarily suspended after the 1965 war, was resumed a few months later, but at reduced levels.

In recent years educational and cultural exchange

programs with Pakistan have been almost non-existent, while those with India, which were extensive, have been curtailed because of decreasing financial support from American sources and increasing obstacles placed in their way by the government of India. Ironically, prospects for a renewal of these programs, on a small scale, in Pakistan, and even for their inauguration in Bangladesh, are good, whereas the Indian government is being so "sticky" about them that the whole future of Indo-American cultural and educational exchange programs is in jeopardy. Private American investment in South Asia has never been great. The South Asian countries are experiencing great problems in expanding their trade relations with the United States.

Official American relations with the states of South Asia, while formally correct, have been anything but close. South Asia does not seem to be a part of the world of President Nixon and his adviser, Henry Kissinger. In the South Asian states, many of the key people in the governments are ill-informed about the United States, and some are clearly hostile to it.

The government of the United States is not well organized or staffed for satisfactory relations with the South Asian countries. The Department of State is largely ignored by the White House on South Asian affairs, as well as on many other aspects of foreign relations. Responsibility for South Asian relations rests with the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, an unfortunate union in view of the understandable preoccupation with the Middle East. United States official representation in South Asia reached the height of absurdity in the summer of 1972, when Ambassador Kenneth Keating left India to return to the United States to campaign for the reelection of President Nixon, one of India's least favorite Americans. By that time, all the top United States diplomatic posts in the South Asian countries were vacant, except for Nepal, where the able and charming Ambassador Carol Laise (Mrs. Ellsworth Bunker) was the dean of the diplomatic corps. No American ambassador has yet been appointed to Bangladesh, even though the United States extended belated recognition to that new nation on April 4, 1972. The ambassador's post in Ceylon has been vacant since December, 1971.

"TILT TOWARD PAKISTAN"

Thus, when the situation in South Asia reached the crisis point as a result of the events following the December, 1970, general election in Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi's overwhelming electoral victory in early March, 1971, and, above all, the brutal repression of East Bengalis by Pakistani troops, the United States was in a poor position to be very effective in what President Nixon insisted was "a determined year-long effort to prevent a war." Its actions after March 25,

² Max Ways, "The 'National Interest' in a Multipolar World," *Fortune*, LXXXV (June, 1972), 191.

1971, reduced its influence almost to the vanishing point. Its leaders failed to speak out publicly against what Indians and others called the "genocide" in East Pakistan. Instead, the United States maintained that continuing ties with Pakistan President Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan were helpful, providing opportunities to influence him to moderate his policies in East Pakistan, to urge him not to order the execution of the captured East Bengali leader, Sheik Mujibur Rahman, and to persuade him not to go to war with India. The United States showed little understanding or appreciation of Indian viewpoints, or of the real and increasingly intolerable pressures being placed on India by the influx of refugees from East Pakistan—which by late 1971 numbered some 10 million and were costing India between \$2 million and \$3 million a day, threatening India with communal strife and social tension as well as economic distress.

The failure of the "international community," of which the United States is a leading member, to come to India's aid in any adequate way to meet the mounting burdens of refugee relief was a cause of great disillusionment to Indians, and was probably a significant factor in precipitating the Indo-Pakistani war of December, 1971. Throughout the period of growing strains in Indo-Pakistani relations, the United States "tilt toward Pakistan"—a term that came into common currency as a result of the revelations of columnist Jack Anderson after the outbreak of the December war—was increasingly obvious.

Many Indians were infuriated because official American spokesmen were more critical of India than of Pakistan during the entire course of the 1971 crisis. The idea that the United States would "equate" India with Pakistan, at a time when the root causes of the crisis obviously lay in the internal developments in Pakistan, was incomprehensible to them, and aroused their strong resentment. They were particularly resentful when they learned that, in spite of assurances to the contrary by American spokesmen, some American military equipment whose delivery had been contracted for prior to March 25, 1971, was sent to Pakistan well after the outbreak of the savage civil war in East Pakistan.

The Indo-Soviet treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation, signed on August 9, 1971, was received with remarkable equanimity in the United States, although it increased the long-standing American apprehensions about the nature and extent of Soviet influence in India. It was hard for Americans to accept at face value Mrs. Gandhi's bland assurance that the treaty in no way altered India's policy of nonalignment. The treaty gave Indians a greater sense of security at a time when they were feeling isolated and were concerned about possible Chinese intervention in the event of war with Pakistan. It may have encouraged India to continue her hard line

toward Pakistan. During the war, the Soviet Union strongly supported India, although it apparently was interested in bringing the struggle to a speedy end, before it had serious international repercussions.

During her visits to several Western capitals, in October-November, 1971, Mrs. Gandhi was able to explain India's position in the South Asian crisis to leaders and peoples of the countries she visited. She was well received everywhere, including the United States, but apparently her talks with President Nixon were unsatisfactory to her. She later complained that the American President did not seem to understand the nature and implications of the crisis in South Asia.

During the December war, anti-American feeling in India reached new heights. Almost every day, some American statement or action seemed to reaffirm the "tilt toward Pakistan" and the anti-Indian bias of United States foreign policy. High American officials referred to "aggression" by India, but not by Pakistan. In the United Nations, the United States sponsored a series of resolutions in both the Security Council and the General Assembly which were regarded by Indians as anti-Indian. The climax came in the closing days of the two-week war, when a task force of the United States Seventh Fleet, including the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier *Enterprise*, entered the Bay of Bengal.

The alleged reason for this formidable "show of force"—to stand by to help in the evacuation of the few American nationals in East Pakistan, if necessary—was so transparently inadequate, or even false, as to confirm the worst fears in India of United States hostile intentions. No convincing reason has ever been given for this display of "gunboat diplomacy" at a critical period in the Indo-Pakistani war. It may have been no more than an old-fashioned "show of force" to demonstrate to both India and Pakistan the United States concern with the struggle in South Asia and to exert pressure on both countries to end the hostilities before they had wider consequences. It may have been designed to deter any possible intervention in the South Asian conflict by the Soviet Union, on the side of India, or by China on Pakistan's side. It may have been prompted by a fear that India, which was clearly getting the upper hand in East Pakistan and would soon be able to marshal overwhelming might against Pakistan on the western front, might take advantage of Pakistan's distress to move into the Pakistan-held portion of Kashmir and to smash Pakistan's military machine. Both President Nixon and Kissinger have repeatedly stated that they had "convincing evidence" of such intentions on India's part, evidence which they considered to be "conclusive" and which, as President Nixon said, "we could not ignore." India has indignantly denied any such intentions, and not a shred of the alleged "convincing evidence" has ever been made public. In-

dians interpreted the *Enterprise* episode not only as indicating that the United States was an immediate security threat to India, but that it had become, for the first time, a long-term security threat.

Even after the war ended, with the surrender of some 90,000 Pakistani troops in Dacca on December 16 and the cease-fire on the western front, the tensions in Indo-American relations continued. President Nixon's decision to escalate the war in Vietnam was strongly criticized in India, but very little attention was directed to the new North Vietnamese offensive in South Vietnam, which had prompted his decision. Both President Nixon and Mrs. Gandhi have publicly expressed their interest in entering into a dialogue with each other with the object of giving a new turn to Indo-American relations, but no real dialogue has actually occurred. In his 1972 foreign affairs message, President Nixon gave greater attention to South Asia than he had in the two previous messages; but some of his observations offended Indian sensitivities. Examples were his statement that the United States had "convincing evidence . . . which we could not ignore" of probable Indian intentions to move into Pakistan-held Kashmir and to destroy Pakistan's armed might, and two sentences which Indians regarded as innuendos regarding India's genuine interest in not throwing her greater weight around in South Asia at the expense of her neighbors and in developing "balanced relationships" with the major powers.*

On the whole, many Indians welcomed the beginnings of an American rapprochement with the People's Republic of China and the new initiatives in United States-Soviet relations. Both developments were interpreted as long overdue steps in the direction of peace.³ But Indians were fearful that any closer associations of the United States with the Communist giants might have unfavorable consequences for them. They suspected that the leaders of the great powers were plotting secretly to divide the world into spheres of influence and to decide the fate of other countries on the basis of *realpolitik*. They were incensed when it became known that in June, 1971, Kissinger, who had stopped only briefly in New Delhi, had gone to Peking from Pakistan in order to lay the basis for President Nixon's now historic visit to China the following February. From that time on many Indians were convinced that the American President's "tilt toward Pakistan" was motivated in large part by his interest in "opening the door" to China.

When President Nixon was in China, Mrs. Gandhi

publicly hailed his visit as a step toward peace, but she also warned that India would not accept any agreement concluded secretly by the leaders of the two big powers that was detrimental to India's interests. When the President went to Moscow in May, 1972, to sign the antiballistic missile systems and arms limitation agreements, Indian spokesmen welcomed these evidences of a breakthrough in the United States-Soviet impasse on matters of concern to the whole world, but again expressed fears that the two superpowers would make decisions that would adversely affect the other states.

India has received nearly \$10 billion in economic assistance from the United States, and she will need aid for some years to come, on a declining scale. The fourth five year plan (1969-1974), whose overall targets and estimates seem to err on the optimistic side, assumes that some \$2.5 billion in foreign aid will be available during the plan period. India will need another \$2.5 billion for debt repayments, unless these are postponed. Much of this aid, as in the past, will have to come from the United States, even though other developed countries are assuming a larger share of the aid burden. But the whole question of United States aid to India has run afoul of Indian ambivalence and sensitivities, and American "aid weariness" and declining aid appropriations.

Mrs. Gandhi and other Indian spokesmen refer repeatedly to their determination to end the aid relationship—a determination which the United States should applaud—and sometimes they go further and insinuate that continued aid should under no conditions be accepted, because it is demeaning to India and because aid-giving nations, especially the United States, try to use it as an instrument of pressure against India. The United States, as President Nixon pointed out in his 1972 foreign affairs message, is "in national disarray regarding our approach to economic assistance." Congress is in a balky mood, reflecting the "aid weariness" of the American people, and the President's requests for aid appropriations have been drastically cut. Hence, in all probability the United States, through the Aid-to-India Consortium or bilaterally, will not provide much additional aid to India; and Indian criticisms of the United States and of the intentions of American aid, together with a reluctance to ask for any further assistance, will further impair the aid relationship. Fortunately both countries agree that this particular relationship should end as soon as possible.

MUTUAL DISTRUST

Unfortunately, the gaps of understanding and of credulity between India and the United States go far deeper and extend far more widely than those created by the fact that President Nixon and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi obviously do not march to

³ On June 1, 1972, at a meeting of the All India Congress Committee, Mrs. Gandhi even "described the coming closer of the United States to the Soviet Union and China as a vindication of India's foreign policy." *India News*, XI (June 16, 1972), 1.

* For excerpts see pp. 224ff. of this issue.

the same drummers or dream the same dreams. At the highest official levels in the United States, India seems to have a relatively low priority. At similar levels in India, the United States is viewed with distrust and suspicion, and even its basic intentions and good faith are suspect. As a result, United States-Indian relations, while still officially correct, are in reality in shambles, and little is being done to improve the present unhappy situation.

Indians and Americans are still preaching to each other, but neither seem to be listening. Neither India nor the United States is inclined to accept the other's interpretations of its own policies and aspirations. In each country, the gap between words and deeds, between protestations and performance, is glaringly wide. President Nixon seems to be a leading exponent and practitioner of balance of power concepts, and to be greatly concerned with power considerations. Perhaps, as a writer in *The New York Times Sunday Magazine* suggests, he does think in terms of a five-power world,⁴ and is not much concerned with the rest of mankind. Mrs. Gandhi, like most Indians, has an instinctive aversion to the language and the practice of the balance of power, which she regards as an outmoded and dangerous doctrine.

Consciously or unconsciously, however, Indian leaders often think in terms of power. They are well aware that India is now in a more dominant position in South Asia, which they interpret as simply a restoration of the "natural balance" in the subcontinent, and they think that India will be a more influential factor in Asian, and indeed in world, affairs. They are still conscious of their relative weakness vis-à-vis the great powers, three of whom are directly involved in the affairs of the subcontinent. They are particularly suspicious of China, with whom relations have been strained since 1959, and of the United States, who sided against them in the recent crisis and whose actions and policies they have often disapproved. They look to the Soviet Union for continued encouragement and support, but they do not want to be locked too closely in the embrace of the Russian bear. They are suspicious of all the great powers, including the Soviet Union. This is shown, for example, in attitudes toward the growing naval presence and activity of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean area. While they are especially critical of American policies in the area, and remarkably reticent about Soviet activities, Indian leaders want the Indian Ocean to be a "zone of peace," free from the rivalries and the naval presence of all the big powers.

NEED FOR POLICY REORIENTATION

In his 1972 foreign affairs message, President Nixon

⁴ James Chace, "The Five Power World of Richard Milhous Nixon," *The New York Times Sunday Magazine*, February 20, 1972.

declared: "We are still engaged in the essential policy of redefining our role in the world." He also stated that the United States was reviewing its entire South Asia policy, within the framework of its overall policy review. This point was reaffirmed by Kissinger in a press conference on February 9, 1972. If such a reappraisal of United States policy in South Asia really took place before the American presidential elections of 1972, the results have not yet become apparent. Certainly such a reappraisal is badly needed, and should be made as soon as possible. Policies which alienated all of the major states of South Asia—even Pakistan, which was dissatisfied with the limited nature of the United States support—surely need to be reassessed. Was it necessary to pay such a high price to promote larger interests and objectives, such as the new relationships with China and the Soviet Union?

It is therefore time—indeed long past time—for the United States to take a fresh look at South Asia and at the new order that has emerged in that part of the world, and to place its relations with all the South Asian countries on a new and sounder footing. This will be particularly difficult in the case of India, for the wounds opened by recent differences are still unhealed and neither India nor the United States, at official levels, seems to be in a mood to make the necessary approaches and concessions. The United States should give more attention to India, and make more of an effort to understand Indian attitudes and policies. It should help India to improve its trade position, and it should continue its aid to India, on a reduced scale, if India is receptive to further aid. It should show more interest in promoting educational and cultural exchanges, at official and unofficial levels, between the United States and India, and India should certainly reverse her present policies (often not admitted officially) of closing the doors on such exchanges. In short, it is time that the "cold war" between India and the United States, which does no credit to either country, should come to an end.

For some time, starting in the early 1960's, United States relations with Pakistan, which had been fairly extensive during the years following the announcement, in 1954, of the decision to extend military assistance to Pakistan, were increasingly cool and

(Continued on page 228)

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"... the promise of the Nixon doctrine and the prospective Washington-Peking détente indicate that long-term American policy will probably be oriented toward improving relations with India and deemphasizing military alliances."

The Resurgence of India

BY GARY R. HESS

Professor of History, Bowling Green State University

AS INDIA MARKED THE 25th anniversary of independence in 1972, her leaders and people reflected a renewed sense of national pride and confidence. The dramatic events of 1971, notably the overwhelming victory of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Congress party in the parliamentary elections and the reduction of arch-enemy Pakistan through the brief Indo-Pakistani war which gave Bangladesh her independence, assured India of internal stability and preeminence in South Asia. Indeed it would seem that recent developments signal the beginning of a third distinctive phase of India's post-independence history.

The long awaited attainment of independence in 1947 initiated the "Nehru Era," in which Indian politics and foreign policy were dominated by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. On the international scene, India embraced an assertive foreign policy, formulating and championing the policy of nonalignment, providing leadership for the Afro-Asian peoples, and frequently criticizing the diplomacy of the major powers. At home, the Congress party, which had led the long struggle against the British raj, faced little serious opposition and controlled the central and state governments. Ambitious plans for increasing industrial and agricultural production were launched; although economic advancement failed to measure up to popular expectations, the profound admiration for Nehru virtually foreclosed criticism of his policies.¹

This era of domestic tranquility and a heady foreign policy ended abruptly in the fall of 1962 when Chinese forces attacked and overran Indian outposts in the

Himalayas. The Chinese invasion, an outgrowth of differences over the Sino-Indian border, left the Indians bewildered and disillusioned. Indian defenses had proved inadequate; Nehru's assumption of Chinese-Indian friendship had been mistaken; Nehru and other leaders had floundered during the crisis; and, above all, India had been embarrassed and humiliated. After the Chinese invasion, Nehru, by that time in failing health, lost his political zest; after his death in 1964, his successors—Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964–1966) and Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter—had difficulty commanding popular support and maintaining the unity of the Congress party.

In the 1967 elections, the Congress party lost 70 seats in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of Parliament), leaving it with only a bare majority; in state elections, the Congress lost its majority in 8 of 15 states. Moreover, the sharp differences between the conservative and left wings of the Congress party rendered it largely ineffective as a governing body. As the Congress declined, regional political parties, accentuating the linguistic and cultural differences among the peoples of India, gained increased popular support. Among the more successful of the regional groups were the Dravid Munnetra Kazhagam in Tamil Nadu, the Akali Dal in the Punjab, and Shiv Sen in Maharashtra.

Economic disappointments and hardships in the mid-1960's reinforced the loss of confidence in the central government. Successive poor monsoons caused a decline in agricultural productivity, soaring food prices, decreased purchasing power for non-agricultural products, and dislocations throughout the economy. The trend toward internal particularism led many observers to believe that India was entering a prolonged period of instability which would eventually give rise to a new political system centering around three or four major national parties.²

India's resurgence in 1971, however, reversed this trend and significantly altered her internal and inter-

¹ For a thorough survey of Indian developments of this period, see Norman D. Palmer, *The Indian Political System* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961), pp. 182–266.

² Lewis P. Fickett, Jr., "The Politics of Regionalism in India," *Pacific Affairs*, 44 (Summer, 1971), 193–210; Iqbal Narain, "India: Democratic Politics and Political Development in India," *Asian Survey*, 10 (February, 1970), 88–99; Iqbal Narain, "Ideology and Political Development: Battle for Issues in Indian Politics," *Asian Survey*, 11 (February, 1971), 185–196; Pran Chopra, "India's Congress Falls Apart," *New Statesman*, 78 (November 7, 1969), 646.

national positions. In the March, 1971, elections, Mrs. Gandhi's New Congress party gained a two-thirds majority in the Lok Sabha. Since Mrs. Gandhi placed her leadership on the line, the victory enabled her to achieve a degree of political predominance similar to that once enjoyed by her father. Considering the division within the old ruling Congress party, the lack of mass communications, and the centrifugal appeal of the regional parties, Mrs. Gandhi's success in uniting the nation behind the New Congress party constituted a remarkable achievement.

Two basic factors appear to account for this unexpected popular mandate. First, Mrs. Gandhi correctly calculated that the electorate would respond to the appeal of a leftist-oriented national party. After the 1967 debacle, she forced the division of the Congress party, fashioning the New Congress as a leftist alternative to the Old Congress party's conservative and moderate policies. She followed this action with the politically popular decision to nationalize the country's banks, and promised further extensions of the "public sector" at the expense of the "private sector" of the economy. Most political observers believed this effort to define sharp ideological lines would fail; it was commonly assumed that the widely dispersed Indian electorate would not respond to national issues and would vote on the basis of local issues. Moreover, it seemed that the parties of the right, especially the Old Congress party, the Swatantra, and Jan Sangh, would benefit from an anticipated conservative reaction to Mrs. Gandhi's economic policies. The regional parties also appeared to be still gaining strength. The electoral returns, however, confirmed Mrs. Gandhi's political acumen: the public endorsed her call for far-reaching reform.

Second, the New Congress victory also resulted from the inept strategy of the opposition parties. By focusing their campaigns on Mrs. Gandhi's program, the parties of the right and center in effect made her the only issue. At the same time, the opposition parties failed to offer an alternative program or leader. In a nation where the public traditionally has voted on the basis of identifying dominant personalities with parties, this opposition strategy played into the hands of Mrs. Gandhi and the New Congress party.³

WAR IN PAKISTAN

Before Mrs. Gandhi had the opportunity to implement her electoral promises, India's attention and energies were diverted by the civil war in Pakistan.

Following the breakdown of negotiations between Sheik Mujibur Rahman who asserted East Pakistan's claim to virtual independence and Pakistani President General Yahya Khan who refused to acquiesce in the division of his country, the Pakistani army, in late March, 1971, seized control of East Pakistan and sought to suppress the Bengali separatist movement. In the following weeks, hundreds of thousands of east Bengalis sought asylum in India.⁴

For India, the struggle presented opportunities and problems. At the political and strategic level, the prospective division of Pakistan would achieve a paramount goal of Indian diplomacy: the attainment of Indian predominance in South Asia. Despite her apparent superiority in resources, arms and population, India had been consistently frustrated by Pakistan. Brief wars over Kashmir (in 1947-1948 and 1965) had proved inconclusive. From New Delhi's perspective, Pakistan had been able to hold her own with India only through her dependence on outside powers; the United Nations had tended to favor Pakistan's position in the Kashmir dispute in 1948, and, more importantly, Pakistan had been receiving arms from the United States since 1954 and, in recent years, from China as well. The success of the Bangladesh movement would lead to her economic and military dependence on India, giving India much more influence, while substantially reducing that of her primary rivals, Pakistan and China.

The prospect of Pakistan's loss of her eastern wing also confirmed the historic Indian nationalist denial of the "two nation theory" on which the partition of India in 1947 had been predicated. During the struggle for independence, the Indian National Congress claimed to represent all Indians. The All-India Muslim League, which emerged as the chief rival of the Congress, gradually came to embrace the proposition that the Hindu and Muslim communities of India constituted two nations. By 1940, the Muslim League demanded the establishment of Pakistan as a homeland for the Muslims; during the next several years, the Muslim League attracted a wider following, although many Muslims continued to support the National Congress.

Finally, in early 1947, the leaders of the National Congress accepted partition, but even then with the greatest of reluctance. The Republic of India was established as a secular state (with a large Muslim population), while Pakistan was created as a Muslim state. The long standing East Pakistani grievances against the policies of the dominant West Pakistani government underscored the fundamental weakness of the "two nation theory," i.e., religion alone could not hold the Muslim peoples together. Meanwhile, India, through the appeal of nationalism, had been able to retain the unity of her culturally and religiously diverse population.

³ Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, "The Writ from Delhi: The Indian Government's Capabilities after the 1971 Election," *Asian Survey*, 11 (October, 1971), 958-69; Myron Weiner, "The 1971 Election and the Indian Party System," *ibid.* (December, 1971), 1153-1166; Pran Chopra, "Political Realignment in India," *Pacific Affairs*, 44 (Winter, 1971-72), 511-526.

⁴ *The New York Times*, March 26, 1971, p. 1.

While these strategic and historic considerations encouraged Indian support of Bangladesh, they also presented problems. The influence of the big powers in South Asia restricted India's freedom of action. Would China or the United States intervene in the event of warfare between India and Pakistan? On April 11, 1971, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai endorsed Pakistan's determination to retain her national sovereignty and promised support if India attacked Pakistan.⁵ The position of the United States at the time was less certain, although Washington, at least tacitly, was siding with Pakistan. Also, while India might find in the Bangladesh movement a reaffirmation of her approach to national unification, Indian leaders were concerned that the separatist movement in East Bengal might encourage similar trends within India. Despite India's general success at preserving unity and the cohesive effect of the 1971 elections, Indian unity remained fragile.

The tide of refugees presented the most immediate and serious problems, compelling India to take unanticipated actions. By early June, some five million refugees had crossed the border and were placing a serious strain on the Indian economy. The central government's initial relief allocation of \$80,000,000 proved insufficient. The refugees generally remained in the chronically depressed state of West Bengal, where some two million people were already unemployed.⁶ The native population resented the intrusion of the refugees, who were seen as rivals for the limited food and resources of the area. The problems caused by the refugees contributed to the instability of the West Bengal government. To the central Indian government, the only solution was for the refugees to return to Bangladesh; yet the general Indian sympathy for the plight of the people of Bengal precluded forcing their return or sealing the border. On June 25, Mrs. Gandhi presented the government's position:

We are looking after the refugees on a temporary basis. We have no intention of allowing them to settle here. Neither have we any intention of asking them to go back merely to be butchered.⁷

The implication of the Prime Minister's statement was clear: only Pakistani concessions to the Bengalis would alleviate the refugee problem.

⁵ William J. Barnds, *India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers* (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 244.

⁶ *Economist* (London), June 12, 1971, pp. 67-68.

⁷ Barnds, *India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers*, p. 242.

⁸ *The New York Times*, August 7, 1971, p. 1; *ibid.*, August 10, 1971, p. 1. For the text of the treaty see pp. 222ff. of this issue.

⁹ *Economist* (London), August 14, 1971, pp. 13-14; Barnds, *India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers*, pp. 243-244; *The New York Times*, August 12, 1971, p. 2.

¹⁰ J. D. Sethi, "Indo-Soviet Treaty and Nonalignment," *India Quarterly*, 27 (October-December, 1971), 327-336; Chester Bowles, "America and Russia in India," *Foreign Affairs*, 49 (July, 1971), 640-645.

The grueling problems of the refugees and the antagonism of China and the United States led the Indians to seek support from the Soviet Union. In early August, D. H. Dhar, the former Indian Ambassador to Russia, made a special trip to Moscow, and, a few days later, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited New Delhi. Most Western observers anticipated that the Soviets were at most intent upon making a gesture of solidarity with India. But on August 9, Gromyko and Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh signed a 20-year treaty of friendship. The key clause in the 12-article treaty pledged consultation and cooperation in the event that either party became involved in a war with a third nation. From India's viewpoint, this served as a useful warning to Pakistan and China.⁸

Yet the Soviet Union was not intending to give India a "green light" to force the issue with Pakistan. While Moscow had earlier criticized Yahya Khan's repression of the Bengalis and the Soviets on August 11 affirmed that they and the Indians shared identical views on the Pakistan problem, the Russians were not anxious for a military showdown. Although siding with India, Moscow wanted to retain influence in Pakistan to which it had provided economic and technical assistance, largely in an effort to balance Chinese influence. It would seem that the Soviet government hoped that the treaty would: (1) help to stabilize the situation by discouraging any precipitate action by Pakistan; (2) give Moscow some leverage in restraining India if that became necessary.⁹

The Soviet-Indian treaty astounded political observers largely because it seemed to represent an abandonment of India's traditional nonalignment. Indian leaders quickly denied such criticism, noting that article four of the treaty explicitly recognized India's policy of nonalignment. Yet mere words cannot preserve a policy. In effect, India had gradually abandoned nonalignment over the past decade as she became increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union for massive arms supplies. The Indian army, navy, and air force had been largely equipped by the Soviet Union. (Many Indian observers and former United States Ambassador Chester Bowles have argued that India was forced into this dependence on the Soviet Union by the refusal of the United States to provide the arms needed by India. The United States, however, was still supplying the Pakistani military.) Viewed in this sense, it could be concluded that the 1971 treaty affirmed the demise of nonalignment. Yet it would be incorrect to regard the treaty as seriously restricting India's freedom of international action. Perhaps it will enable India to enhance her own power with Soviet help, but this does not preclude the eventual improvement of India's relations with the United States, China or Pakistan, and a lessening of dependence upon the Soviet Union.¹⁰

By the time of the signing of the treaty with the Soviet Union, India's refugee population had reached 7,500,000. Unless a settlement were reached, it was estimated that another 2,500,000 would cross the border before the end of 1971. The Indian government allocated an additional \$275 million for refugee relief while the international community provided \$150 million, but this assistance proved inadequate. Despite pressure from the people of West Bengal and from rightist political leaders and newspapers to intervene in the Pakistani civil war, the Indian government temporized. India did, however, provide sanctuary and assistance to the Bangladesh guerrillas, who were increasingly successful against the Pakistani army.

The Indian reluctance to force a showdown continued throughout the fall of 1971. The Indians were confident that they could defeat Pakistan in a brief war over Bangladesh, but they were not certain that the war could be kept brief and limited. Pakistan might attack India's positions in Kashmir to force New Delhi's abandonment of Bangladesh. Despite the Indo-Soviet treaty, no one could be certain of the Chinese and American responses. Given these uncertainties, Mrs. Gandhi's government concluded that its interests rested in forcing Pakistan, through diplomatic channels, to compromise with the Bangladesh insurgents. The principal effort along these lines was Mrs. Gandhi's early November visit to Washington where she conferred with United States President Richard Nixon. Apparently, the Gandhi-Nixon talks led the United States to exert increased pressure on Yahya Khan to reach a settlement.¹¹

But within two weeks, Indian troops had become directly involved in the Pakistani civil war. On November 24, Mrs. Gandhi acknowledged that Indian forces had crossed into East Pakistan three days earlier, but added assurances that only one raid had occurred and that it had been staged in self-defense. A few days later, however, the Indian government announced that Indian troops would continue to attack Pakistani positions in self-defense. By this point, the drift toward a military solution seemed irreversible. Whether India would still have been satisfied with a diplomatic settlement worked out by the United States or other major powers, whether India intended to restrict herself to "defensive" actions or had already decided to launch a full-scale invasion, whether the Pakistani government could have considered a compromise when faced with these Indian intrusions are all questions which cannot be fully answered. It does appear that India had finally calculated that the circumstances warranted a military gamble. New Delhi must have concluded that the prospects for a brief

and limited military action were favorable. The reactions to the initial thrusts into East Pakistan suggested that while the United States and China would be disturbed by an Indo-Pakistani war, their responses would probably be restrained. On December 1, the United States suspended arms shipments to India, but that had a negligible effect on India's military capabilities.

FULL-SCALE WAR

Amidst conflicting Indian and Pakistani charges of aggression, full-scale warfare became a reality by December 3. Two days later, Mrs. Gandhi recognized Bangladesh as an independent nation. Indian troops advanced steadily against the demoralized and isolated Pakistani army. After the Indians occupied the capital, Dacca, and received the surrender of Pakistani forces there, India, on December 16, ordered a cease-fire. In the fighting in Kashmir and elsewhere in the west, the Indians generally achieved their objective of holding the Pakistanis at a standstill. The Indian victory was complete: Bangladesh was independent; Pakistan had been reduced; Indian predominance had been assured. The London *Economist* labeled Mrs. Gandhi "the empress of India."¹²

But the Indians paid a price for their victory. Most of the major powers and even the preponderance of the Afro-Asian nations believed that India had acted hastily. During the first days of the fighting, the Soviet Union vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and troop withdrawals. China, the United States and nine other members of the council voted in favor of the resolution. Even more disconcerting to India was the General Assembly's overwhelming approval (by a vote of 104 to 11) of a similar resolution. Only the Soviet Union, its eastern European satellites, and India voted against the measure.

India's relations with the United States suffered markedly; indeed the frequently troubled Indo-American relationship reached its nadir. Washington quickly branded India as responsible for the conflict, curtailed some \$90 million in development loans, and dispatched a naval task force toward the Bay of Bengal. The Nixon administration was irritated by what it regarded as India's deliberate sabotaging of a

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¹¹ *Economist*, November 13, 1971, pp. 38, 45; *The New York Times*, November 5, 1971, p. 10.

¹² *Economist*, December 18, 1971, pp. 27, 28.

"A new order is slowly emerging from the ruins of the older order in Pakistan. Despite formidable problems, the government has taken its first hesitant steps toward democracy and is indecisively edging in the direction of a more equitable economic system."

Pakistan under Bhutto

BY KHURSHID HYDER

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THE INDO-PAKISTANI WAR of 1971 and the consequent dismemberment of Pakistan have effected fundamental changes in her internal politics and external relations. The year 1971 forms a watershed in the brief and checkered history of the country, marking the end of a phase and the beginning of a new era. It will take some time for concrete and well defined policies to emerge from the prevailing confusion and unrest.

On the political front, by far the most outstanding development inseparably linked with the war is the total eclipse of the political role of the army. For 13 long years the army dominated and controlled the politics of the country with tragic and disastrous results. Except for the military defeat, it is doubtful if the army could ever have been eliminated as the determining factor in politics. There is such widespread anger and disgust at the policies of the army and the imbroglia into which it dragged the country that for many years it cannot stage a political come-back. The only contingency in which it could reacquire political control would be the total breakdown of civilian control and a law-and-order situation verging on anarchy. Short of that, the political role of the army has been effectively neutralized for a long time to come.

The other point to be emphasized is the secularization of politics brought about by President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his party's ascendancy at the center and in the two major provinces, Punjab and Sind. In the nineteenth century, the great Muslim reformer, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, successfully wrested the leadership of the Indian Muslims from the hold of the orthodox divines and set them on the road to modernism. Except for the Khilafat interregnum, this trend continued to predominate Muslim politics until 1947. But soon after the death of Mohammed Ali Jinnah in 1948, there was a resurgence of the rightist parties. Lacking economic and social programs, politicians adopted obscurantist tactics and exploited religious sentiments for the furtherance of their respective po-

litical aims. It is to Bhutto's abiding credit that he launched a political party with a socialist manifesto, thereby bringing to the fore urgent economic and social issues that are directly relevant to the teeming millions, and successfully detaching religion from politics. Despite the obfuscation and pettifoggery of the rightist parties, the Pakistan People's party (PPP) swept the polls and consummated the process of political secularization initiated by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. From now on economic issues will determine the dynamics of politics. The political survival of the rightist parties will depend on their ability to meet the challenge of rising expectations and to provide an answer to the growing economic and social problems which, after years of suppression, have burst into the open and have unsettled settled attitudes and policies.

Another prominent feature of the political scene is the fact that for the first time in 25 years Pakistan has a popularly elected government at the center and in the provinces. This has given the people a sense of participation in the political affairs of the country. Bhutto's peculiar techniques of announcing decisions at public meetings, seeking approval for decisions at mass gatherings, and staging spectacles like the open swearing-in ceremony at the Race Course in Rawalpindi have certainly created for the masses the illusion of being associated with the decision-making apparatus of the government.

Since political activity has emerged after years of military repression, there is understandably a great deal of political activism devoid of any purpose. In the circumstances, political stability and institutionalized politics are the two prime requirements of the 1970's. Under growing pressure, Bhutto reluctantly lifted martial law in April, 1972—four months earlier than scheduled—and introduced the interim constitution, based on the Government of India Act of 1935 and the Indian Independence Act of 1947. Provincial autonomy has been conceded, but it is overshadowed by a plethora of overriding powers for the center ostensibly designed to meet various emergen-

cies. The draft constitution will not be ready until March, 1973. The government seems inclined towards a presidential form of government with a reasonably strong center. The Law Minister, addressing the Bar Council in Lahore on July 23, 1972, said that future constitutional arrangements were expected to center around a popularly elected President and a bicameral legislature responsible to the Lower House.¹

One of the main problems facing the framers of the Constitution will be to determine the degree of autonomy to be granted to the provinces and to work out an acceptable base for center-state relations. The opposition parties, particularly the National Awami party (NAP), want a federal parliamentary system and maximum autonomy for the provinces.² The secession of East Pakistan has aroused lively apprehension about the domination of Punjab in the other three provinces. Punjab is the biggest and richest province, with a population more than the combined populations of Sind, Baluchistan and NWFP. The only way to allay these fears is to concede maximum autonomy to the provinces. Given the ruling party's preference for a strong center, there is bound to be considerable discord and friction between the government and the opposition over the form of the future constitution. It may not be easy for Bhutto to bypass the opposition parties, since they command the majority in two provinces. Moreover, even in his home province, Sind, a strong center will not be tolerated and will lead to the gradual erosion of his support.

The PPP was elected on a socialist mandate. During the election campaign, extravagant prospects were held out to the working class promising them a bright new world free of exploitation and geared to providing maximum social and economic benefits. This naturally touched off a groundswell of expectations which, in the best of times, would have been difficult to fulfill. But in the aftermath of the war and defeat, the loss of East Pakistan, the urgent need to adjust the economy to the altered circumstances and to cope with the shortfalls and shortages created by nine months of very costly military operations in East Pakistan have made it well nigh impossible to meet the persistently rising demands of the workers.

The government has, however, made some formal gestures to check spreading unrest and to take some of the heat out of the labor discontent and agitation which had assumed alarming proportions in all industrial cities, particularly Karachi. It has taken over the management of a number of large firms but has left

ownership intact, following the Economic Reforms Order promulgated in January, 1972. It has also abolished the managing agency system which was regarded as an anachronism. There had been a growing pressure for its abolition, particularly after India eliminated the system a number of years ago. A new labor policy has also been announced, which promises to raise the workers' share in the profits and seeks to enlarge considerably the scope of fringe benefits. In March, 1972, land reforms were announced which have reduced the maximum ceiling on individual ownership of land from 500 to 150 irrigated acres and from 1,000 to 300 non-irrigated acres. Land becoming surplus as a consequence of lowering the ceiling is to revert to the state which, in turn, is to distribute it among the landless peasants.

The aforesaid reforms and the manifesto of the PPP notwithstanding, the government and its policies are far from socialist. Not a single industry has been nationalized. The land reforms are just an eyewash, and have not in any significant manner brought about the redistribution of land in favor of the landless peasants. The recent budget has not levied an income tax on land revenue. But given the general unrest and the revolution of rising expectations among the workers and the peasants, the government will be forced eventually to move towards greater socialization. The land ceiling will have to be lowered further; revenue receipts will be subjected to income tax, and some industries will be brought under state control. A maximum limit will have to be placed on wealth and incomes. The concept of welfare cannot be left vague and ambiguous, but will have to be given content by bold and radical policies geared to providing economic and social benefits for Pakistan's struggling and impoverished millions.

FOREIGN POLICY

The breakaway of East Pakistan is bound to have a far-reaching impact on the direction and course of Pakistan's foreign policy. To quote Bhutto:

The severance of our eastern wing by force has significantly altered our geographic focus. This will naturally affect our geopolitical perspective. The geographical distance between us and the nations of South East Asia has grown . . . at the moment, as we stand, it is within the ambit of South and Western Asia. It is here that our primary concern must henceforth lie.

There is the whole uninterrupted belt of Muslim nations, beginning with Iran and Afghanistan and culminating on the shores of the Atlantic and Morocco. With the people of all these states we share a cultural heritage, religious beliefs and a good deal of history. There is thus a community of interests which is further buttressed by the similarity of our aspirations and hopes. Clearly we have to make a major effort in building upon the fraternal ties that already bind us to the Muslim world.³

It is obvious that Pakistan will from now on give

¹ *Dawn*, Karachi, July 24, 1972.

² In a press interview, the NAP leader, Wali Khan, said that the minority provinces are demanding maximum autonomy and a federal system of government in which the Parliament consists of two houses and all the provinces get equal representation in the Upper House. The minority provinces, according to him, fear that Punjab will dominate them. *Dawn*, Karachi, August 20, 1972.

³ *Dawn*, Karachi, April 16, 1972.

top priority to the fostering of closer links with the Muslim countries. This explains Bhutto's whirlwind tour of the Muslim states in January and May, 1972. The underlying aim of the overtures to the Muslim countries seems to be to evolve a consensus on the issues which face the country and to elicit their support in the negotiations with India and Bangladesh. During the 1971 War, most of these countries supported Pakistan. None of them, except for Iraq, has yet recognized Bangladesh. Relations with Libya, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have become particularly close in view of the aid extended by them during the war and their continuing support.

A natural corollary of Pakistan's emphasis on her links with the Muslim countries has been the reactivation of her role in CENTO. For the first time since 1968, a Cabinet minister was sent to the 1972 CENTO ministerial meeting in London. This represents a sharp reversal of the policy of the 1960's. Pakistan became a member of SEATO and CENTO as a result of the Mutual Security Agreement with the United States. When United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles outlined his scheme for a "northern tier" defense system consisting of countries directly contiguous to the Soviet Union, attention focused on Pakistan as a possible recruit, in view of the refusal of the Arab countries to be drawn into such an arrangement. The avowed purpose of the Baghdad Pact was to counter and contain Soviet influence in the Middle East. At that time, Pakistan was not directly or indirectly menaced by the Soviet Union and its policies; she joined the pact only to qualify for the receipt of military aid from the United States and "to forge closer relations with our neighbors in the Middle East."⁴

However, since Pakistan joined CENTO primarily at the instigation of the United States, the loosening Pakistani-American alliance in the 1960's ineluctably influenced Pakistan's attitude towards it and she gradually deemphasized her role in it. Changes in the global power structure also made it essential for Pakistan to normalize her relations with the Soviet Union, and that, in turn, called for a reduced and passive role in CENTO. Finally, as Pakistan moved to bilateralism, CENTO seemed superfluous.

The happenings of 1971 in the subcontinent have revived Pakistan's interest in CENTO and have invested it with fresh importance. The defeat and dismemberment of Pakistan have brought about a qualitative change in the power balance. Pakistan is now much more vulnerable to combined Indo-Soviet pressures than she was in the 1960's. Diminishing American interest in South Asia is paralleled by enhanced

Soviet activity, aimed at the isolation and encirclement of China and the establishment of Indo-Soviet hegemony. The Soviet Union is strongly entrenched in India and Afghanistan. Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union—except for a brief span of five years, 1965–1970—have not been too friendly. Pakistan's alignment with the West and her membership in the pacts in the 1950's, close links with China in the 1960's, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union's special relationship with India, on the other, precluded the possibility of abiding friendship between the two countries. Ex-President Ayub Khan's visit to the Soviet Union in 1965, and the Soviet Union's non-partisan role in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, followed by its active mediation between the contending neighbors at Tashkent, infused some warmth and cordiality into Pak-Soviet relations.

In the post-Tashkent period, the Kremlin seemed interested in a balanced policy towards the two adversaries. But its role in the East Pakistani crisis and its Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with India signified a deliberate and decisive change in policy.⁵ Moscow renounced the role of an impartial arbiter in Indo-Pakistani affairs in favor of total alignment with India, irrespective of the repercussions of this policy on its relations with Pakistan. Soviet policy since the war is aimed at reducing and weakening Pakistan as a political force on the subcontinent. The developments of 1971 have thus lent substance to what was hitherto only a vague fear of Soviet expansion. In the 1950's, the Soviet threat was nonexistent, or at best latent; currently it is active. Consequently, Pakistan's interest in CENTO has been reactivated. Pakistan may also hope to obtain military supplies through the CENTO partners because the resumption of American military aid on a bilateral basis seems improbable in the near future.

INDO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS

Indo-Pakistani relations have taken a turn for the better, it seems, as a result of the recently concluded agreement at Simla. The relations between the two countries for the last quarter of a century have been uniformly unfriendly. The historical rivalry between the Hindus and the Muslims culminating in the partition of the subcontinent, the events before and after partition, the Kashmir dispute, conflicting foreign policies and, above all, a general feeling in Pakistan that India had not accepted the finality of the partition, foreclosed all possibilities of good neighborly relations. In view of the developments emanating from the 1971 war, the power balance in the subcontinent has decisively and irrevocably shifted towards India. Pakistan can no longer adhere to the policy of confrontation. It was never a viable policy; in the altered circumstances, it has become dangerous and irrelevant. Pakistan has been reduced by one-

⁴ Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters* (Karachi, 1967), p. 154.

⁵ For the text, see pp. 222ff. of this issue.

half. India is in occupation of nearly 5,000 square miles of Pakistani territory in the Punjab and Sind, and is holding 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war. It was, therefore, essential for Pakistan that parleys at the summit level be initiated.

As far as India is concerned, her unequivocal victory in the 1971 war achieved her basic aim, i.e., the breakup of Pakistan. The Muslims of pre-1947 India are now split into three groups—those in Bangladesh, in Pakistan, and the Muslim minority in India. To all intents and purposes, Bangladesh will be a client state of India; Pakistan halved cannot pose a threat to India. India may not now be seriously interested in any confederal arrangement with Pakistan, or any other scheme of reunification that would make the Muslims a strong political force in India. Split into three more or less equal portions, they are not likely to pose a serious challenge to the Hindu domination of the subcontinent. The policy of “divide and rule” has reemerged as the guiding principle of India’s policy towards Pakistan. India may thus, for the first time, be genuinely desirous of seeking an accommodation of differences with Pakistan. India is also keen to regain and revive her influence in the third world, where her prestige suffered a sharp slump on account of her policy towards Pakistan. The vote on the cease-fire resolution in the United Nations General Assembly made this clear. To refurbish her tarnished image, it was important that India seek to compose her differences with Pakistan on the basis of a mutually acceptable agreement rather than impose a settlement which Pakistan may be constrained to accept under duress but which could never become the basis of a durable peace.

In view of all these factors, the summit meeting at Simla in July, 1972, did not end in a fiasco, but brought about an agreement on some of the issues arising from the 1971 war. According to the agreement, the two countries have “resolved to put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations.” They have also agreed to the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, to non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, to the gradual resumption of communications, trade and diplomatic relations, to the withdrawal of forces to their side of the international border and to a final settlement of the conflicts over Jammu and Kashmir.⁶

The agreement is only a first step in the process of protracted and complex negotiations to settle the dispute. After a generation of strife, the two countries have been able to edge towards a friendlier dialogue. But from Pakistan’s standpoint, the agreement is far from satisfactory. In agreeing to settle disputes by

peaceful means, Pakistan has been forced to accept indirectly a sort of “no war pact,” which she has resisted for the last 25 years. The United Nations role in Kashmir has been obscured in favour of bilateral negotiations—another clear gain for India. Troop withdrawals are confined to international borders and Kashmir has not been included. Nothing has been settled at Simla about the prisoners of war. Their repatriation will have to wait till after Pakistan recognizes Bangladesh. But a defeated Pakistan could not have hoped for anything better; one cannot lose the war and win the peace. Pakistan had nothing to offer except professions of friendship. This is the irreducible price she had to pay for her defeat.

THE KASHMIR DISPUTE

The Kashmir dispute has been frozen for the time being. It will take some time before a final agreement on it can be negotiated. Although Bhutto is prepared for a military disengagement in Kashmir, political disengagement seems difficult. Pakistani sentiment is heavily invested in Kashmir. For the last 25 years, successive governments have told Pakistanis repeatedly about the economic, political, strategic and even ideological importance of Kashmir. All this cannot suddenly be talked away, or set aside. Public opinion will have to be turned gradually toward the acceptance of the unalterable reality.

For Bhutto the task is difficult. He is hamstrung by his past statements. But since his coming to power there has been a basic change in his position on Kashmir. He has suggested that the cease-fire line be made into a “line of peace” and that it is up to the Kashmiris to fight for the right of self-determination if they want a different future.⁷ He may nonetheless find it difficult to agree to the formal conversion of the *de facto* boundary into a *de jure* border. Political pressures, particularly in the Punjab, may prevent Bhutto from formally acknowledging the permanent division of Kashmir.

There is a consensus that Bangladesh should be recognized. Sheik Mujibur Rahman’s refusal to hold any parleys before recognition, the insistence of his government that war crimes trials be held, and the question of the treatment of the non-Bengali minority in Bangladesh are creating obstacles to recognition. Once there is some understanding on these and other issues stemming from the division of the country, Pakistan will forthwith extend recognition. It is in the combined interests of both countries that diplomatic, economic and communications links should be

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⁶ For the text of this agreement, see page 223ff. of this issue.

⁷ Dilip Mukerjee, *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Quest for Power* (Delhi, 1972), p. 217.

"... with a population increase, a restive population, Soviet influence on the rise, and industry developing very slowly, the future of Bangladesh is highly uncertain."

The Emergence of Bangladesh

By JOHN E. OWEN

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MARTIAL LAW WAS DECLARED in Pakistan in October, 1958. Little more than 13 years later, East Pakistan ceased to exist, and the new nation of Bangladesh was born.

Pakistan's problems were intensified from the start by the geographic division of the country into two wings, separated from each other by more than one thousand miles of Indian territory. The division contributed a great deal to political and economic instability. Partition was in fact an unworkable arrangement from the beginning. The two regions were essentially different in almost every respect: culturally, linguistically, economically and geographically, they were separate countries with little communication between them.

The only links between the two Pakistans were their common Muslim faith, a tradition of British rule, and the use of English by the educated classes of both wings. A minor link was Pakistan International Airlines, but 99 per cent of the population of each wing could not afford to use its services, even if Pakistanis in East and West Pakistan had any ties with one another. The two regions had a mere artificial unity superimposed by political and religious forces, but all sense of community between them ended there. Islam never proved an effective bond of cohesive union. In temperament and personality, the peoples were quite different. The Pathans of the west were hardy aggressive warriors, with a long history of fighting during the British regime in the North-West Frontier. The Bengalis, a much smaller and darker people, were inclined to the arts, poetry (Tagore came from Bengal), rhetoric and philosophical discourse. The Pathans and Punjabis of the North-West had for a long while looked down on the Bengalis as a "non-martial" race.

It was a strange paradox that the Bengali Muslims of East Pakistan had appreciably more in common with the Bengali Hindus of India's West Bengal than with their co-religionists in West Pakistan. They were Bengalis first, Muslims second, and Pakistanis third, in

habits, outlook and customs. They had far closer ethnic, economic, and linguistic ties with West Bengal, a few hours away by train, 40 minutes by plane, than with West Pakistan, 1,000 miles distant. An Indian writer has recently claimed¹ that East Bengal shares everything but its dominant religion with West Bengal, and that "even religion does not divide it from West Bengal as much as other things divide it from West Pakistan." Students and others who visited West Pakistan from Dacca have told the writer that West Pakistan was like a foreign country. Many Bengalis had relatives in Calcutta. The former vice-chancellor (rector) of Dacca University had a brother, Zakir Hussain, who until recently served as President of India.

The two Pakistans might possibly have survived as one had West Pakistan been willing to treat the East wing as an equal. Instead, East Bengalis felt keen resentment at being treated as a "colony" of the more prosperous western province. Bengali Muslims, formerly under the rule of Hindu traders, landlords and moneylenders, felt that they had exchanged one set of exploiters for another. The bulk of Pakistan's foreign exchange was earned by the jute industry of East Pakistan, but most of the money so earned (60 per cent) was utilized for the industrial development of West Pakistan. Though the East wing had only one-sixth of the nation's land area, it had to feed more than half the population. But 85 per cent of its top officials were from the west, as were its military rulers during the period of martial law. And three-fourths of the foreign aid went to the West wing. Even just after partition in 1947, the per capita income of West Pakistan exceeded that of East Pakistan by 10 per cent. By 1960, the discrepancy was 30 per cent; by 1965, it was 40 per cent; and by 1969, 60 per cent.

The central government bureaucracy was manned almost entirely by West Pakistanis, and they controlled and directed the flow of strategic economic resources. The entire machinery of the economy (a system of controls and various public and semi-public corporations) was manipulated to divert resources from East

¹ Pran Chopra, "East Bengal: a Crisis for India," *The World Today*, 27(9: 372) (September, 1971).

Pakistan and to use the bulk of foreign aid for the rapid economic growth of the West wing. During the 1950's, only one-third of public investments went to the East wing, despite its population majority. From 1960 to 1965, the East wing's share in public investment was only 37 per cent. And government-sponsored corporations allotted only one-third of their loan funds for industrial credit and investment in the East wing.

ECONOMIC DISPARITY

According to a large-scale sample survey of industry, the location of capital for all Pakistani industries in 1958 was heavily weighted in West Pakistan, and particularly in Karachi. While East Pakistan that year had only 148 crore of rupee industrial capital (one crore is ten million), Karachi alone had 114.6 crore, and the West wing, including Karachi, had 308.6 crore, more than twice the East wing capital.² With every passing year, the West wing became more industrialized and prosperous, while conditions in East Pakistan deteriorated, and life for the great majority of her people became increasingly a fierce economic struggle to exist.

East Pakistan's economic difficulties arose from a shortage of raw materials, industry and markets, and a decline in the world market for jute, combined with a rising population density that stood at 800 persons per square mile in 1958, and reached 1,200 by 1970. Combined with inflation and the lack of industrial development, this led to a sharp decline in living standards. West Pakistan also experienced widespread poverty, but growing industrialism and advances in wheat-growing led to improved conditions of life for her 50 million people. Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad (the new capital) are today impressively modern cities with a Western air, fine roads and buildings, universities, residential areas and government edifices. Lahore, once termed "The Paris of the Orient," has been a cultural center since the days of Rudyard Kipling. Its Punjab University, established in 1884, is the fourth oldest university in the entire subcontinent. Thus, while West Pakistan began with a more established economic base, the East wing had very little. Its one university at Dacca, established by the British

in 1921, suffered the exodus to India of many scholarly Hindu professors at the time of partition.

For over a decade, both wings suffered a lack of competent and dedicated leadership. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, father of Pakistan, died in 1948, and there was no experienced body of civil servants who could be relied upon for integrity of administration. Nor was there a well-developed party system.³ The cost of government was exorbitantly high, and a heavy ratio of the national revenue was allocated to defense (against India). For several years, the army was the one group not affected by the widespread corruption, and in 1958, under Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, it declared martial law. This provided a measure of needed stability, but as conditions still worsened in the East wing in the 1960's, with rising student and labor unrest, President Khan resigned office in the spring of 1969.

Belated attempts were made to give economic and political parity to the East wing during the 1960's. The disparity between the two wings grew, and the impact of technological change and rising urbanism in East Pakistan only engendered an ethos of frustration and a disrupting influence on the traditional social structure, creating a new class of alien industrialists, and exacerbating the deep social divisions. The rising middle class did not have time to establish itself or to exert any stabilizing influence on the prevalent dissatisfaction with deteriorating economic conditions. The mood in the steamy noisy jute mills was one of rising rebellion. A factory worker had to work for nine hours a day, 48 hours per week, and as recently as 1965 his average wage was only Rs.100 to Rs.120 per month, a bare subsistence.

And with every year, the sense of being merely a colony of West Pakistan was heightened. The economy and administration were in alien hands. In addition, the country was losing its jute monopoly to Russia, Brazil, Thailand, China and Burma. All the causes of unrest in the early 1960's were doubled after 1964. The students and intelligentsia wanted a more democratic rule and a land of their own. They were also aware that government corruption was not lessening.

In the summer of 1968, 35 Bengalis were charged with trying to plot the secession of the province. Riots against Ayub and violence became almost daily occurrences in the cities of both wings. But it was the East wing that erupted. Airline employees went on strike and closed off the airport, effectively dividing the two wings, and Dacca University went on strike. The police were unable to control the raging mobs; a shortage of food threatened; and students controlled the province almost completely. Terrorism threatened from the extreme right-wing industrialists, and all civil administration proved ineffective. The situation so deteriorated into anarchy that Ayub met with opposition leaders in February, 1969, and accepted their

² Gustav F. Papanek, "The Location of Industry," *The Pakistan Development Review*, X(3): 300 (Autumn, 1970). See also S. Guisinger, *Economic Development Report No. 63* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.A.: Development Advisory Service, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University), June, 1967, and Anisur Rahman, "East and West Pakistan: a Problem in the Political Economy of Regional Planning," Occasional Paper, No. 20, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University), July, 1968.

³ For a brief review of the pre-Partition political background and the constitutional problems after 1947, see Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, "The Emergence of Pakistan: From Nationhood to Statehood," *The Round Table* (London), 240: 595-602 (November, 1970). See also S. H. Schanberg, "Pakistan Divided," *Foreign Affairs* (U.S.A.), 50: 125-135 (October, 1971).

demands for direct adult voting rights and parliamentary government. But the opposition could not agree on what it wanted; Ayub could no longer count on the loyalty or support of the army; and, in a national broadcast, he finally relinquished office on March 25, 1969, in favor of General A. M. Yahya Khan.

YAHYA KHAN TAKES OVER

So ended Ayub's rule of ten years that began in October, 1958. Pakistan had made very real progress during his regime, with the gross national product going up by over 50 per cent, grain production up an appreciable 23 per cent by 1968 (with new strains of wheat and rice), and self-sufficiency in many industrial products. He had given his full support to family planning schemes, in opposition to orthodox Islamic forces. But mounting discontent had brought general strikes of workers and students and a state of national anarchy; thus change was inevitable. Ayub had been seriously ill the year before, and at 61 he was a very tired man. He had been the only leader of stature in Pakistan since Jinnah, standing head and shoulders above the mass of his countrymen. Yet the staggering problems of a new nation were too much for any one man to cope with, even though the army, the landlords, and the new industrialists were on his side.

Pakistan suffered from too many disparate groups, conflicts of ideologies, and a striking absence of any common tradition or experience in democratic political practices. Ayub's valiant attempt to bring order and unity to his country had to contend with a heritage of divisiveness, illiteracy and political unsophistication that proved too strong. The unrest in the last years of his rule was not peculiar to Pakistan but was almost typically post-independence Asian, part of the growth pains of developing countries. Ayub genuinely tried to lift his people to a new level of political maturity, but few Pakistanis were ready for the demands made by this learning process.

Upon taking office, Yahya Khan at once proclaimed martial law. The constitution was abrogated (for the second time in eleven years); the National and Provincial Assemblies were dissolved; and government ministers ceased to hold office. This was almost a replica of the 1958 take-over. The statements of the two Khans on assuming office were very similar. Both referred to a rapidly deteriorating situation, and to the civil disorder that necessitated military rule. Yahya's martial law regulations were almost identical with those Ayub promulgated in 1958. Three deputy martial law administrators were appointed to form a Council of Administration; free elections were looked to in the future; and, in the meantime, measures were taken against corruption.

It was a relief to many that order was at last restored, after five months of strikes and bloodshed. Workers went back to their jobs at higher wages won

by strikes, and students returned to the schools that had been closed since the previous October. So Pakistan tried to start again, as she had almost 11 years earlier. Two constitutions, one in 1956, and the other in 1962, had proved inoperable and unacceptable.

But the basic causes of discontent remained: the widespread poverty and hunger, the uncertain future, the chafing at government repression, the disagreements over who should rule the country, and the East wing's demand for parity and autonomy, with over 70 million Bengalis feeling they were still colonials. Yahya expressed his awareness of the disparity, and his new economic policy prescribed a minimum industrial wage of Rs. 115-140 per month. Agitation and unrest persisted nonetheless. Trade unions, usually organized within individual factories, demanded that wage levels be brought up to the minimum declared by Yahya and strikes continued, despite the martial law regulation against them. Employers faced with rising labor costs tried to cut down their labor force, which produced more strikes. In October, 65,000 cotton textile workers in the East wing went on strike, and there were demands for equity from the new middle class and from Indian migrants. The old conflict flared once more and, in November, in Dacca, riots resulted in six fatalities and injuries to 70 people.

ELECTIONS ANNOUNCED

The Yahya regime, like the Ayub administration that preceded it, had begun by lifting the more stringent regulations but, unlike the 1958 government, Yahya's gave students a voice in politics. Yahya's recognition of the East wing's disparity vis-à-vis West Pakistan encouraged local Bengali politicians to renew their demands for autonomy and political representation on the basis of population. At the end of November, 1969, eight months after taking office, Yahya announced plans for the restoration of a federal parliamentary system and proclaimed that the "one man-one vote" principle would be honored for the first time in elections to be held on October 5, 1970, a date later changed to December 7.

According to Yahya, there was to be universal adult suffrage; the elected National Assembly was to draft a constitution. East Pakistan would have the majority voice in the Assembly because East Pakistanis outnumbered West Pakistanis. The Assembly would be granted 120 days to draft a constitution; in 1971, the country would have a parliamentary form of government with a Prime Minister and a Cabinet, and more provincial autonomy. The electoral rolls included 60 million Pakistanis over 21, all eligible to vote and to choose delegates to the constitutional convention. With the constitution approved, the government would be inaugurated and the 313 delegates, including the 168 from East Pakistan, would comprise the National Assembly, or Parliament.

Meanwhile, in November, 1970, a severe cyclone and tidal wave destroyed thousands of Bengali homes with a heavy loss of life. The central government's attitude was one of indifference, and relief came in from abroad much faster than from West Pakistan. The government's slow response strengthened Bengali conviction that only through independence could Bengal control her own future.

When the elections were held, the Awami League, led by Sheik Mujibur Rahman, gained all but two of the 168 seats from East Pakistan, winning more than 70 per cent of the vote there. With the largest single party in the Assembly, Mujibur had an excellent chance of becoming Prime Minister. In West Pakistan, Ali Bhutto's newly formed Pakistan People's party gained 81 seats out of 138.

Mujibur had outlined a six-point program for regional autonomy, on the basis of which he had fought and won the election. His program provided that the constitution should assure a federated Pakistan and a parliamentary government, built on the supremacy of an elected legislature and universal adult suffrage; this federal government would be concerned only with defense and foreign relations, and other matters would be the province of the states; each wing would have its own freely convertible currency or one currency with two separate reserve banks, to forestall any flight of capital between the wings; the states would have the right to tax and to collect revenue, setting aside a share for the expenses of the central government; economic and legal reforms would reduce the disparities between the two wings; and East Pakistan was to have her own militia.

But West Pakistani leaders under Ali Bhutto feared that Mujibur's six-point program was a prelude to plans for secession of East Bengal. On February 5, 1971, Bhutto declared that his party would not attend the Assembly scheduled to meet March 3 unless Mujibur modified his six points. On March 1, Yahya yielded to Bhutto's demand that he postpone the Assembly indefinitely. In response, Mujibur called for a campaign of noncooperation in the East wing; in the violence that followed, more than 300 persons were killed. On March 6, Yahya agreed to convene the Assembly on March 25. Both Bhutto and Yahya went to Dacca in mid-March, possibly to buy time until the Pakistani army could be readied for the final suppression of the province. Again, on March 23, the

Assembly was postponed. Meanwhile, Mujibur demanded an end to martial law, withdrawal of the armed forces, an investigation of the shooting of the striking Bengali textile workers, and a transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people.

The record of what actually transpired between Yahya and Mujibur is far from clear, but Yahya's action in postponing the Assembly confirmed Bengali suspicion that the West wing had no intention of honoring the results of a free election if those results displeased it. Significantly, it was while Yahya was negotiating with Mujibur that the army action against the Bengalis began. The course of events after March 25, 1971, is well-known: the campaign of genocide; the influx of refugees into neighboring West Bengal (India); India's entry into the conflict after Pakistani incursions on her borders; and the short-lived December war that led to an independent Bangladesh.⁴

Seldom has a nation started its independent life under circumstances as inauspicious as Bangladesh. Mujib was immediately confronted with the task of administering the return and resettlement of about 7.5 million refugees from India, plus 10 million displaced from their homes by the war. It was also important to bolster a national economy which had a per capita annual income of \$60 and no reserves of capital. And the government had to restrain the widespread desire for retaliation against the non-Bengalis who had sided with the Pakistani army, and to maintain power against Maoist elements in Bangladesh.

It has been estimated by one authority that minimal repair and reconstruction of the area's essential facilities—transport, communications, factories, and utilities—will cost \$1.5 billion. An estimated 6 million homes were destroyed and 1.3 million agricultural families were deprived of their livestock and the implements to farm their lands.

Jute, the leading source of foreign exchange (\$207 million in 1969–1970) cannot be transported until inland waterway and rail transport is made available. As late as June, 1972, less than half the normal exports of raw jute were leaving Bangladesh, and her 400 local mills were operating at only about 35 per cent of capacity. The region's jute exports are not particularly well-established on the world market, and the industry now faces competition from synthetics.

The Bangladesh Planning Commission estimates that \$3 billion will be needed to restore the economy to the level of 1969–1970. Even under normal conditions, the region had to import at least one million tons of grain annually. Bangladesh's needs for 1972 may

(Continued on page 233)

John E. Owen served as a Fulbright lecturer at Dacca University in 1958–1959, and as a United Nations adviser to Dacca University from 1960 to 1963.

⁴ It should be noted that the United States role in supplying arms to West Pakistan after 1954 enabled the West wing to maintain its economic and political hold over the Bengalis and generated more widespread rebellion in Bengal, since it kept in power a regime that the majority saw as repressive. The official silence from the White House during the nine months of genocide and mass terror in East Pakistan evoked many expressions of indignation from liberal opinion in the United States and elsewhere. It is tempting to consider whether the entire tragedy might have been averted had Washington followed a different policy vis-à-vis the military authorities in West Pakistan.

"Ceylon's domestic compulsions . . . coupled with certain international developments . . . seem to be the critical variables responsible for her low posture in foreign policy. . . ."

Sri Lanka Today

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THIRTY MONTHS AGO, a general election in Sri Lanka swept into power a left United Front (UF)¹ government under the leadership of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike. With a membership of 116 in an elected House of 151 (plus six nominated members), the UF had an unprecedented majority to push through its electoral promises, which meant a virtually total overhaul of the island's political and economic structure, plus a "left oriented" radicalization of foreign policy.

Looking back over these months, the pluses and minuses stand out in bold relief. Soon after coming to power, the government initiated a number of administrative innovations which broke some of the established traditions of the Westminster-type parliamentary democracy in the island. One of the major reasons for this was the UF leaders' belief that the implementation of their policies needed "committed" men at the top.

Accordingly, a large number of permanent secretaries of Ceylon's Administrative Service (CAS) resigned soon after the takeover by the UF and were replaced by young non-CAS professionals known to be committed to the UF or to one of its constituents or sympathizers. At the lower level, too, the government took various measures to facilitate the functional decentralization of the district administration "in order to bring it near to the people." Except for a few posts at the top, all government servants were accorded trade union and political rights enjoyed by employees in the private sector. In addition, as a step towards self-management, employees were ap-

pointed directors in some of the public concerns, and workers' councils were formed in several others. At the grass roots, through legislation, the government had created about 9,000 *Janata* (People's) committees at the ward level, whose chairmen were to be selected by the minister of local self-government and who were to be in direct touch with the center.

Apart from introducing changes in the administrative structure, the UF government effectively utilized its majority to give the country a new constitution which does away with the various checks and balances inhibiting the legislature from giving effect to the "will of the people" expressed through elected representatives. The supremacy accorded to the unicameral legislature—called the National State Assembly—is evident from the fact that the new constitution has, in effect, abolished the right of judicial review (in the sense that it exists in India or the United States). Further, the executive—the Cabinet—has assumed the right of public appointments,² an authority generally vested in the autonomous organs of the state in the traditional pattern of a parliamentary democracy. This gives constitutional legitimacy to the administrative innovations.

The enactment of the constitution changed the status of Sri Lanka from that of a dominion to a republic in the British Commonwealth. The constitution recognized "socialist democracy" as the objective of the state and acknowledged the supremacy of the religion and language of the majority community by according the "foremost place" to Buddhism and the status of the official language to Sinhalese.

These basic tenets of the Constitution were primarily a response to the insistent demands of the indigenously educated rural elite in the island, which was largely responsible for the overwhelming success of the UF in the general election. As it happens, however, the revolt of this group against the tardy pace and the inadequacies in the implementation of the electoral promises assumed the proportions of an in-

¹ In coalition with the peasant and middle-class based democratic socialist Sri Lanka Freedom party (SLFP) are the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaj party (LSSP) and the Moscow-oriented Ceylon Communist party (CCP) both of which have their primary bases of power in urban centers, more particularly, among the working class.

² A critical appraisal of the new constitution is made in Urmila Phadnis and Lucy M. Jacob, "The New Constitution of Sri Lanka," *India Quarterly*, October-December, 1972 (forthcoming).

surgency in April, 1971. This continues to bedevil the UF government.

THE 1971 REVOLT

Launched as a struggle of the "People's Liberation Front" (*Janata Vimukti Peramuna*), erroneously but commonly known as the Che Guevarist movement, the revolt all but annihilated the government in April, 1971. With multi-national military assistance,³ the government put down the insurrection, and arrested about 16,000 young men and women, mostly in the 14-30 age group.

The detention of most of them for about a year and the declaration of a state of emergency cannot be said to have fully succeeded in containing the revolt. Moreover, the scars of the military measures taken to bring the situation under control are yet to heal.

There are many obvious indications of the United Front's awareness of the need to rehabilitate itself. Continuing press censorship and the postponement of by-elections in four constituencies measure the gulf between a popularly elected government and the people. Meanwhile, sporadic acts of violence and an increasing number of crimes in the countryside continue to plague the law and order situation in the island.

Apart from the crises of "authority" and "political mobilization," the government is simultaneously confronted with the crisis of national integration. The special position accorded to Sinhala and Buddhism in the constitution has had a sharp reaction from the influential Tamil Federal party, which has been controlling nearly half the elected seats in the Tamil-populated northern and eastern provinces.

Declaring that adequate safeguards were not provided for the minorities in the constitution, the federal party demanded that the Tamil language (which is spoken by about 22 per cent of the island's population) should be accorded parity with Sinhalese. It is on this issue that the Federal party staged a walk-out of the Constituent Assembly debates in June, 1971, and was joined in its protest by the Tamil Congress in May, 1972, when the constitution was promulgated.

Soon afterward, these two parties formed a Tamil United Front (TUF) and on June 26, 1972, the Action Committee of the front submitted a six-point memorandum to the government to secure redress of Tamil grievances. It declared that if these demands were not met, the TUF would launch a "nonviolent direct action" to secure the "political, social, economic and cultural emancipation of the Tamil people."

Assaults on Tamil leaders who are UF sympathizers, and the publication of inflammatory literature in

the north inciting violence against Tamil "traitors" are indicative of the existence of militant youth organizations who do not subscribe to the "non-violent" approach of the TUF. Nor do they seem to have much faith in its aging leadership. Thus, about 300 youths picketed the members of the Tamil Action Committee in June, 1972. Their demands for youth participation in its deliberations and for the immediate resignation of the Tamil M.P.'s *en bloc* from the National State Assembly in protest against the "Sinhala" constitution are clear indications of the way the wind is blowing in the northern and eastern parts of Ceylon.

The growing law and order problem in the Tamil areas of the island and the insurgency contingencies in the heartland have had their impact on the island's economy in a variety of ways. For one thing, the government has been forced to step up its defense expenditure considerably, adding to the inflationary strains on an economy overburdened with expenditure for an extensive welfare system. This includes free education, virtually free medical services and heavy subsidies on food supplies, altogether adding up to one-fourth of the country's budget. Thus, last year's uncovered budgetary deficit was estimated at Rs.1,327 million and is expected to be of the order of Rs.1,798 million in 1972.

This apart, unsettled conditions in the rural areas and on the plantations seriously affected the production of paddy as well as of tea and rubber—the two major cash crops which constitute the mainstay of the island's primary economy. This imposed additional strains on exports.

The consequence of these economic difficulties showed up glaringly during 1971 when the real per capita income actually declined by 1.1 per cent. According to the latest annual report of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, the growth rate during 1971 was 0.9 per cent compared to a rise of 4.1 per cent in 1970, while the population increase was of the order of 2.0 per cent.

The shortfall in production on the plantations heightened the country's balance of payments crisis. Structurally dependent on the plantation crops of tea, rubber and copra for its exports, the island's foreign exchange earnings have been continually subject to fluctuations in world prices and a relatively inelastic demand for these commodities. During 1971, on rubber alone, Ceylon's foreign exchange earnings dropped by more than Rs.100 million.

An intractable factor in the government's budgeting of its foreign exchange resources has been the large import of foodstuffs, particularly rice, to enable it to meet its commitments to provide a subsidized ration. A variety of permutations and combinations have been tried to reduce the strain on the island's foreign exchange resources, but in vain.

In fact, since 1942, every government in Ceylon

³ Timely assistance arrived from the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Aid and promises of assistance also came from the U.A.R., Yugoslavia, Malaysia and China.

has been committed to provide rice—the staple food of the people—in ration and at a fair price. In the competitive politics of the island, successive governments continued to put up with this strain because, politically, none found it feasible to do away with the high subsidy. A couple of attempts, when made, proved abortive. An attempt to cut the rice subsidy by the United National party (UNP) Prime Minister, Dudley Senanayake, in 1953, for example, virtually led to his political demise.

In 1965, the UNP government, confronted with an economic crisis at home and an acute shortage of rice abroad, diluted the ration formula to reduce the subsidy element; instead of giving people two measures of rice at a subsidized price of 25 cents per measure, it cut the ration in half but gave it away free of charge. In the election of 1970, the UF made this an electoral issue, and pledged the restoration of another measure if it was voted to power, even if the country had to import large amounts to sustain it. Soon after its victory, the UF restored the second measure (charging 75 cents in the beginning and raising it to Rs.1 at the end of 1971) on a ration entailing a cost of about Rs. 240 million annually in subsidies.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the inherent structural weaknesses in the economy are unable to sustain public subsidies of this magnitude. A preliminary report of a socio-economic survey conducted in 1970 by the Department of Census and Statistics revealed that over 9 million of the island's 12.4 million population had no income at all, while half of the remaining 3.4 million earned less than Rs.100 per month.

Reflecting manpower utilization, the report, in effect, was the reiteration of an estimate that over 500,000 were unemployed in 1970. According to the socio-economic survey, of those in open unemployment, 82 per cent belonged to the 15–24-year-old age group.

No wonder that two diverse reports, the ILO report of a mission headed by Professor Seers on "Matching Employment Opportunities and Expectations: A Programme of Action for Ceylon" (1971) as well as the IBDR report on Economic Trends in Ceylon (1971) stressed the imperative necessity of the elimination of free rice and a cut in other food subsidies so that surpluses could be made available for investment on employment-generating projects. Worse, a substantial proportion of foreign aid was being diverted to consumption.

Curiously enough, during her visit to Peking in June–July, 1972, Mrs. Bandaranaike was reportedly given similar advice by Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, who told her that "providing free rice, free health services and free education," as Ceylon was doing, was not "socialism"; that instead of utilizing aid for development purposes, Sri Lanka had been "eating it

up," and that it was a sorry spectacle for an independent nation "to go seeking aid from foreign countries."

In the initial phase of the UF rule, the Sri Lanka representative at the United Nations, Shirley Amarasinghe, had echoed similar thoughts about foreign aid, maintaining that as a means of financing development it had severe limitations and disadvantages because it created serious problems of debt servicing "which imposes a heavy and recurring burden on the country's foreign exchange budgets in successive years. We believe more in trade and better trade than in aid."

However, the practice of short-term credits during the past few years has created a vicious circle from which Ceylon finds it hard to wriggle out. This is evident from the fact that, in 1972, Sri Lanka will have to pay Rs.766 million or about one-third of her total export earnings to meet her debt-servicing, despite the serious decline in her external reserves and the steady deterioration in the terms of trade. Meanwhile, in order to survive with "a ship to mouth" existence, the various ministers have been scouting around to get project aid as well as short-term loans to keep the country going.

During Mrs. Bandaranaike's visit to Peking, speculations were rife that Sri Lanka might receive another interest-free hard currency convertible cash loan (the first one of Rs.150 million came after the insurgency of April, 1971) of about Rs.200 million from China and thereby might not need to sign another stand-by agreement for a Rs.150-million loan from the IMF, which could be received only after Ceylon fulfilled certain requirements like cuts in subsidies, another devaluation of her rupee, and so on.

Mrs. Bandaranaike did come back with a loan of about Rs.300 million from Peking, but the whole loan is earmarked for developmental projects. Consequently, Sri Lanka has been forced to take certain desperate measures to meet her foreign exchange problems. Foreign exchange allocations for raw materials are drastically cut even at the risk that some industries will be shut down. And price controls have been relaxed so that the manufacturers can charge more and can ward off the retrenchment of workers.

A sharp rise in the cost of living index from 104.8 in 1961 to 141.9 in 1971, scarcity of essential goods, stagnation of industrial development and a continuous increase in the number of educated unemployed (notwithstanding the fact that the UF government has found jobs for 120,000 people during the last two years) are some of the hard facts of Sri Lanka's economic life today which seem to force the government to adopt a low posture in its foreign policy, in sharp contrast to its "radical" orientation two years ago when, within months after coming to power, it accorded full diplomatic status to East Germany as well

as to the governments of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the Revolutionary Provisional Government of South Vietnam. To show her anti-imperialist fervor on behalf of the Arab cause, Sri Lanka broke her diplomatic ties with Israel. The Asia Foundation and the United States Peace Corps were asked to close their offices in Colombo.

FOREIGN POLICY SHIFT

Ceylon's domestic compulsions—the growing economic difficulties and the insurgency of 1971—coupled with certain international developments, i.e., the Sino-United States détente, the Indo-Soviet treaty, the growing competition of the major powers for their presence in the Indian Ocean area and the emerging power patterns in the South Asian region as a result of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war and the severance of Bangladesh from Pakistan—seem to be the critical variables responsible for her low posture in foreign policy today.

Perhaps the most conspicuous shift in Sri Lanka's foreign policy orientations has been her attitude towards the superpowers. Thus, while Mrs. Bandaranaike had continuously opposed the naval presence of the major powers in the Indian Ocean area, she was noticeably silent when the United States aircraft carrier *Enterprise* sailed into the Bay of Bengal at the height of the Indo-Pakistani conflict. Commenting on "a quiet but strategically important thaw" in United States-Sri Lanka relations, *The New York Times* correspondent James P. Sterba wrote in April, 1972, from Colombo, that "the verbal abuse that only a year ago rained down on American 'imperialism' from Colombo politicians and the local press has virtually stopped. . . . United States warships are quietly pulling into port for rest stops here for the first time in recent memory." Sterba, however, was mistaken when he continued that "Soviet warships meanwhile are not," for soon after receiving the Commander in Chief of the United States forces in the Pacific, John S. McCain, Mrs. Bandaranaike welcomed the chief of the Soviet Pacific fleet, Admiral Nikolai Smirnov, on a goodwill mission.

In fact, the parameters of "collective security" are being very adroitly manipulated by nonaligned Sri Lanka today. American, Soviet and Chinese ships have been unloading their cargoes of arms and ammunition in Colombo port during the last few months. According to newspaper reports, China has sent four of the five gunboats promised as gifts to the island plus large quantities of ammunition.

On August 1, 1972, when a Tamil member of the Ceylonese National Assembly questioned the need for so much armament in view of the past assurances of the ministers that the government had an adequate stock of arms, "even one bullet for every individual,"

the Deputy Minister for Defence and External Affairs, Lakshman Jayakkody, replied that these were meant for the island's security—"both internal and external." Chinese military aid, he maintained, was to safeguard the island's frontiers to fight illicit immigration and smuggling from India which was barely 22 miles away across a shallow gulf. It would also be used to "preserve the unitary form of government," he added. The last reference was obviously a warning to the politically discontented and resentful north, the home of the opposition member of Parliament.

It might be noted that during the debate on Bangladesh in the U.N. General Assembly, when the Ceylonese delegate in the U.N. dubbed the liberation war in Bangladesh as a "fratricidal" and "secessionist" movement, he also had in mind the possible repercussions of such a movement on the minority Tamil community of the island, the major political organization of which—the Tamil Federal party—had been demanding provincial autonomy through a federal structure. Apart from this, the disintegration of Pakistan would have meant a disturbance in the power balance between India and Pakistan, a balance fostered by countries like the United States and China which did give small countries like Ceylon some leverage in their bargaining stances with India.

RELATIONS WITH INDIA

It is necessary to note that with her geographical proximity, historical traditions and ethnic composition, India has been a major factor in Ceylon's foreign policy and a key variable in her domestic politics. Thus, whether it has been the UNP or the SLFP government, one of its major efforts has been to assert the island's national identity as well as its economic independence vis-à-vis the Indian elements. In political and strategic contexts, too, Sri Lanka seems to be more than "oppressed" by her proximity to her neighbor.

Historical memories exacerbate this; virtually every invasion of Ceylon was staged from India or via India, and it was Ceylon's strategic importance vis-à-vis India that made her an alluring prize to the Western colonial powers in South Asia.

The comments of a Ceylonese sum up these feelings aptly.

Every government in power in Ceylon since independence has had a nightmarish fear of "big brother" India and its potential for "expansionism." . . . In her geopolitical calculations, Ceylon has sought to maintain extra-friendly relations with Pakistan and with China as a check on possible Indian "expansionism." It was a right wing UNP

(Continued on page 230)

Urmila Phadnis is the author of *Towards the Integration of Indian States, 1919-1947* (New York: Asia Publishing House, Inc.).

Writing of population pressures in India and Pakistan, this specialist points out that "what makes these nations distinctive . . . is not population pressure or underdevelopment . . . but rather the efforts they have made to control population growth in order to encourage more rapid economic development."

Population Pressures in India and Pakistan

By THOMAS E. DOW, JR.

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INDIA, BANGLADESH, AND PAKISTAN, with populations of 552 million, 74 million, and 60 million respectively, are the second, eighth, and ninth most populous nations in the world. In terms of economic and demographic development, they are poor nations with rapidly growing populations. Indeed, their annual rates of population growth (2.5–3.0 per cent) and their per capita gross national product figures (\$81–\$123) are higher and lower, respectively, than the corresponding averages for the entire less developed world. Still, what makes these nations distinctive is not population pressure or underdevelopment—they have “more” of both than most of their Third World neighbors—but rather the efforts they have made to control population growth in order to encourage more rapid economic development. As one might expect, the results have not been the same in India as in Pakistan or Bangladesh.

THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE

Trying to determine the levels of birth and death and the rate of growth of the Indian population is a little like attending a statistical tea party with hatters, hares and door mice: the answers are never quite what you expect and they are certainly never the same. Yet, with the caution of a traveler just returned from a journey in Wonderland, the population analyst must try to weigh the different possibilities and select the most reliable estimates. When this is done, the following impressionistic portrait of the Indian population emerges. Incidentally, in this painting the tones or trends are more significant than the specific values.

Basically, then, if the birth and death rates are thought to fall between 40 and 45 and 15 and 20 per thousand respectively, the most probable rate of natural increase (that is, the difference between the birth and death rates) would be 25 per thousand. Under

these circumstances, and in the absence of mass international migration, the Indian population would double in size every 28 years. Taking a longer time perspective, one can of course discern the demographic path leading to the present rapid growth situation.

Specifically, the death rate has declined rapidly while the birth rate has not. Thus if both rates were approximately 50 per thousand in 1920, it is clear that mortality has been reduced by at least 60 per cent while the decline in fertility cannot have been more than 20 per cent and may well have been significantly less. Under these circumstances, children born in 1970 can expect to live as much as 10 years longer than their brothers and sisters born as recently as 1960. Yet what kind of life will it be? What are the conditions of life in India now, and what will they be in the future; and what has a falling death rate, a high birth rate, and an annual population increase of 2.5 per cent or 13.8 million to do with these conditions?

POPULATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

In terms of socio-economic development, India is running rapidly to stay in the same place. Since gaining independence in 1947, India has increased agricultural and industrial productivity by over 75 per cent and 150 per cent respectively, yet both per capita food production and per capita domestic product were lower in the 1960's than they were in the 1950's. Similarly, although the proportion of the school age population 5 to 19 years of age in the school system has more than doubled between 1950 and 1965, the absolute number of potential students outside the system has also increased.

On the one hand, then, there is more food, more national income, more aggregate production, more

jobs, more schools, more doctors and more homes; and yet, on the other hand, the number of people who must share in these opportunities has increased almost as rapidly, with the result that individual or per capita progress has been discouragingly slow. As I suggested in 1968, the situation is most apparent in the slow advance of personal income in India. Over the entire period of independence, per capita annual income has probably increased by less than \$50, being not less than \$50 in 1950, and not more than \$100 in 1972.¹

To break this cycle, the economy must move ahead more rapidly than the population. Under conditions of rapid population growth, however, such an economic breakthrough or "take off" is extremely difficult to accomplish. In practice, conditions of high fertility and declining mortality have produced a very young population—more than four out of every ten people are under 15 years of age. In meeting the needs of these youthful dependents, as well as the continuing needs of the remainder of the population, both the individual family and the government find it difficult to "get ahead." Essentially, then, the necessity of providing for additional population tends to impoverish both the government and the family, leaving very little for saving, investment and economic growth. Thus "over-shadowing all considerations of national development is the frightening image of a rapidly rising tide of . . . people which is canceling the [socio-economic] gains of the last two decades."² Given this clear and present danger, what has India done to control population growth?

FAMILY PLANNING

In the formulation of its first five year plan in 1951, India acknowledged that the objective of stabilizing the growth of population must be at the very center of planned development. With this objective in mind, in 1952, India became the first country in the world to adopt an official population control program. As the budgetary summary in Table I suggests, substantial policy statements are now complemented by substantial investments.

The effects of such an expanding budget are to some extent reflected in the accomplishments of the program. Sterilizations, for example, have increased from 10,587 in 1956–1957 to over 2 million in 1971;

TABLE I. BUDGETARY SUMMARY

Period		Allocation in Rs Millions for Family Planning Program
First Five Year Plan	(1951–56)	6.5
Second Five Year Plan	(1956–61)	49.7
Third Five Year Plan	(1961–66)	270.0
Original Draft Fourth Five Year Plan	(1966–71)	2,293.1
Revised Fourth Five Year Plan	(1969–74)	3,150.0

while the number of condoms supplied to the population has risen from 5.8 million in 1957–1958 to 71.3 million in 1968–1969. IUD insertions, on the other hand, declined from a high of 915,167 in 1966–1967 to a low of 410,348 in 1969–1970.³ Recognizing that this decline was the result of popular concern over the unanticipated and often untreated side effects of insertion, efforts are now being made to provide more adequate information and post-insertion care.

To bring these services to the people, the government utilizes 31,710 hospitals, clinics, centers and mobile units. Excluding the 256 mobile units, 1,779 of the facilities serve the urban population, while the remaining 29,675 are located in rural areas. These facilities carry out male and female sterilizations, and IUD insertions. They also provide oral contraceptives, condoms and condom equivalents. In all cases, the service or the commodity is free. Moreover, there are often monetary incentives of five, ten, and forty rupees for IUD insertions, male sterilizations, and female sterilizations, respectively.⁴

On balance, then, in terms of budget, personnel, facilities, services offered, and people reached, "the Indian government has made a strong and increasing commitment to family planning. . . ."⁵

EVALUATION

As George Simmons suggests, if we view the Indian Family Planning Program as an economic investment, we can ask how much of a contribution this program is making toward national development. In one sense, this question can be answered by calculating the economic value of preventing a birth. In the present case, Simmons indicates that, when the criterion of per capita income is used, "the value of preventing a birth is Rs. 7,800."⁶ In a crude sense, then, the prevented birth or "missing person" will neither consume nor produce. Given the economic context of India, the net effect of what society gains and loses from this mix is positive: hence, the net economic advantage of a prevented birth.

Granting this relationship, it is possible to calculate the impact of the Indian Family Planning Program by estimating the number of births prevented by the

¹ Thomas E. Dow, Jr., "The Population of India," *Current History*, April, 1968, p. 221.

² Dipak Bhatia, "India: A Gigantic Task," in Bernard Berelson (ed.), *Family Planning Programs* (New York: Basic Books, 1969), p. 67.

³ See George B. Simmons, *The Indian Investment in Family Planning* (New York: The Population Council, 1971), p. 80.

⁴ See Dorothy Nortman, "Population and Family Planning Programs: A Factbook," *Reports on Population/Family Planning* (New York: The Population Council, June, 1971), pp. 26 and 32.

⁵ Simmons, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

program. Although this presents difficult methodological problems, Simmons is able to estimate the number of births prevented by each IUD insertion and sterilization—the major methods available in the program. He concludes that on the average each IUD insertion and each sterilization prevents approximately .54 and 2.35 births, respectively.⁷

With these estimates in hand, it is possible to calculate the number of births prevented in any given year. Although the total was quite modest in 1957–1958 (3,747), it rose rapidly to 1,562,451 by 1968–1969, and is expected to increase to 2,937,980 by 1975–1976. It only remains to combine these estimates with the costs of the Family Planning Program to obtain a final approximation of the program's economic contribution. The equation is simple: one asks what are the gross economic benefits of x number of prevented births, and how much did it cost to prevent them? In the Indian situation, the ratio of "benefits" to "costs" is very high indeed, ranging from 70.5 in 1956–1957 to 40.5 in 1969–1970. Thus in 1956–1957, for example, the gross economic benefits from the Family Planning Program were 122.6 million Rs. and the total family planning expenditure in that same period was 1.74 million Rs.; or $122.6/1.74 = 70.5$.⁸

Recognizing that some substantial margin of error is probable, if not inevitable, in all these estimates, it is still clear that the Indian Family Planning Program has been a "good investment"; so good, in fact, that it should be rapidly extended to the great majority of the population not yet influenced by it.

Although family planning in any degree is a good investment, far more births must be prevented to achieve the broader economic and demographic goals of the program. Incidentally, such goals or targets are largely the creation of economic planners and reflect their desire to stimulate the growth of national or per capita income by achieving the most rapid possible reduction in fertility. Accordingly, the fertility "target" for India's program was set at a birth-rate level of 25 per thousand and was to be achieved by 1975–1976. Although theoretically desirable, this arbitrary demographic target was obviously unrealistic. The desired fertility decline simply exceeded the capacity, organization and intent of the existing family planning program. Something beyond family limitation for maternal and child health considerations alone would be required.⁹

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 55–65.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

⁹ See Dorothy Nortman, "Status of National Family Planning Programmes of Developing Countries in Relation to Demographic Targets," *Population Studies*, March, 1972, p. 7.

¹⁰ Simmons, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

¹¹ See *Population Chronicle* (New York: The Population Council, July, 1972), p. 6.

¹² *The New York Times*, July 2, 1972, p. 2.

Recognizing that its demographic timetable was unrealistic, the government replaced it with a more reasonable plan. Instead of reducing the birth rate to 25 per thousand by 1975, it was hoped that a reduction to 32 per thousand might be achieved by that date; and that the original goal might then be anticipated by 1982. Even these modest aspirations, however, will still require a new approach in family planning. At the very least, if a moderate level of fertility is to be achieved in the near future, the government must adopt a wider view of the available options. In Simmons' opinion, more attention must be given to "policies designed to change parents' . . . family size norms" and to economic programs that will "raise the price that [parents] pay for having additional children to something more closely approximating the price paid by society as a whole."¹⁰ Such further steps are made necessary by the fact that even with the "success" of voluntary family planning, desired family size would still be too high to permit rapid modernization.

The problem, then, is to promote a social and economic climate in which people will come to accept and prefer a small family norm. Assuming that such norms are already fixed at the age of marriage, it will be necessary to go further back into adolescence to achieve a new standard. In this process, the education system might provide the child or adolescent with new information on population and family planning.

At older ages, where family-size norms are relatively fixed, some system of economic rewards may be necessary to motivate new behavior. Such incentives already exist in connection with the adoption of different contraceptive techniques, and could be expanded. Indeed, the recent use of larger cash incentives (65–70 rupees) to promote male sterilization in Gujarat State produced a record total of 223,746 vasectomies in a two-month period.¹¹ Less dramatic, but perhaps potentially more significant, is the "no-birth bonus" plan being carried out in Tamil Nadu State. In this experiment, female teapickers are enrolled in a program in which their employers put five rupees a month into a savings account for each participant. At the age of 45 the woman collects the entire amount with interest if she has not had more than two children. But if she had a third child, she loses 50 rupees from the accumulation; if the gap between the second and third child is less than three years, the cost of the third child rises to 100 rupees. A fourth child means forfeiting an additional 250 rupees, and if she has a fifth child, she loses all.¹²

Of course, these limited program are only straws in the wind, yet some such programs will be necessary if India is to achieve substantially lower fertility in the near future. Regarding prospects for success, one may agree that progress is being made, but one must also admit that the journey will take longer than had

originally been hoped, and greater imagination will be necessary to guarantee its final success. Still, India has a chance, and that is perhaps more than one can say for Pakistan.

THE POPULATION OF PAKISTAN

As in the case of India, the demographic data in Pakistan are not reliable. Consequently, we lack precise measures of fertility, mortality, and population growth. On the basis of available information, however, it seems probable that the birth rate is not less than 50 per thousand, and that the death rate is not more than 20 per thousand. If this "minimum" fertility and "maximum" mortality estimate is accepted, a rate of natural increase of 30 per thousand or 3 per cent results. Noting that a population doubles in size every 23 years at this growth rate, it is sobering to recognize that this is probably a conservative estimate of Pakistan's actual situation.

Following the Indian argument, we may expect that this pattern of high fertility, declining mortality, and rapid population growth will have a similar retarding effect on Pakistan's development efforts. Specifically, with 45 per cent of its population under the age of 15 years, and with 75 per cent of average family income spent on food, it is difficult for Pakistan to generate a level of savings and investment sufficient significantly to outrun the demands of current population growth. Thus when people are not able to save and invest, the rate of capital formation is low and per capita income increases at a very modest pace. Given the "current" socio-economic status of the population, this problem takes on special urgency.

When 70 per cent of the men and 90 per cent of the women 15 years of age or older are illiterate, when only three out of every ten children will be able to attend school, and when families must provide for six or more children on an average per capita annual income of less than \$100, the situation cries out for amelioration. Yet the resources to remedy these ills—radically to improve per capita well-being—are largely absorbed by the subsistence needs of a rapidly growing population. Obviously, a significant reduction in the level of fertility is required.

FAMILY PLANNING BEFORE BANGLADESH

In the first five year plan (1955–1960) the government provided Rs. 500,000 (\$105,000) for support of private voluntary family planning agencies. In some sense, this modest appropriation was consistent with the government's belief that the population growth rate was as low as 1.4 per cent. But the government

was wrong, and this error seriously delayed needed action in the family planning area.

In the second five year plan (1960–1965), the family planning allocation was increased to Rs. 30.5 million (\$6.4 million) and responsibility for implementation was shifted to the Government Health Service. In spite of budgetary increases and administrative centralization, however, the achievements of the program were disappointing. "Inadequate allocation [and poor distribution] of supplies, lack of field workers, absence of newer contraceptive technology, and reliance upon already overburdened health personnel"¹³ were some of the reasons cited for the poor performance of The Family Planning Program in the second five year plan.

By 1965, however, Pakistan had achieved a greater understanding of her demographic and economic situation, and was ready to acknowledge that a vigorous and broadly based program of family planning must be an integral part of the strategy of the 1965–1970 plan. With a higher budget of Rs. 284 million (\$64 million), the Family Planning Program was to "reduce the birth rate from 50 to 40 per thousand by protecting 25 per cent of the nation's . . . 20 million fertile couples. . . ."¹⁴

In pursuit of these ambitious goals, Pakistan introduced a "crash program" of family planning. To provide the necessary personnel, doctors, paramedical assistants, and village midwives were trained in family planning techniques. Initially, it was hoped that the gap in trained medical personnel could be closed by employing 50,000 village midwives to recruit IUD acceptors and follow up IUD cases. Unfortunately, this shortcut failed, in that these untrained and often illiterate women were able to make on the average only two successful IUD referrals per month. Consequently, these women are being replaced by paramedical personnel. By 1970–1971, 1,100 "Lady Family Planning and Health Visitors" were in the field, carrying out 75 per cent of the IUD insertions. By 1970–1971, then, 1,100 female paramedics, 2,300 doctors, and 37,000 midwives were providing family planning information and services at 1,839 hospitals, clinics and centers throughout Pakistan.¹⁵ Their accomplishments were not insignificant.

Between 1966 and 1970, 3.2 million insertions and 1.2 million sterilizations were performed. In both cases, there were substantial "gains" in 1966–1968 and substantial "losses" in 1969–1970. Specifically,

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¹³ Gilbert Hardee and Adaline P. Satterthwaite, "Pakistan," in *Country Profiles* (New York: The Population Council, March, 1970), p. 4.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁵ Nortman, "Factbook," *op. cit.*, p. 28.

"It is difficult, if not impossible, to predict with accuracy the likely course of military events over the next decade or so in the Indian Ocean. . . ." However, "the chance of an outbreak of armed conflict in the Indian Ocean area remains unpleasantly high."

Military Considerations in the Indian Ocean

BY EDMUND JOSEPH GANNON

Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress

IN BROAD STROKE, the Indian Ocean is bordered by four continents: Africa, Asia, Australia and Antarctica. An observer, tracing the coastline on a map of the region, starts at the Cape of Good Hope and moves north along the coast of East Africa to the Horn of Africa. Here, the coastline turns east at the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb¹ and follows the northern tier of nations washed by the Indian Ocean (the Trucial States of the southern Arabian peninsula, Iran, the entrance to the Persian Gulf,² around the Indian subcontinent, and past the newly founded state of Bangladesh). The coastline turns south at Burma and the observer's eye moves south along the west coast of the Golden Peninsula to the city-state of Singapore. Moving further south, past the islands of Indonesia, the observer reaches Australia, which marks the southeastern corner of the Ocean. Far to the south of all these lands is Antarctica, the southern boundary of the Indian Ocean.

In descriptive terms,

The Indian Ocean is 28.3 million square miles, which

makes it larger than either the North Atlantic or the South Atlantic. . . .

The entry from the Persian Gulf is constricted at [Hormuz], that from the Mediterranean is at present closed at Suez and is also narrow at Bab-el-Mandeb. From the east the Indian Ocean may be entered through the Malacca Strait, Sunda or the Lombok passages [of Indonesia], which, like the western gates, are all narrow and shallow.³

The Indian Ocean has been a major "sea highway" for many centuries. Captain Bindra has noted that

for 3,000 years, Phoenicians, Arabs, and Indians have used oceanic navigation on the Arabian Sea. They were doing this long before the sailors of the Aegean Sea learned to navigate the seas. Two thousand years ago men from Hindustan sailed in fleets across the Bay of Bengal to Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific islands. Milleniums before Columbus traversed the Atlantic to discover America and before Magellan circled the globe, the Indian Ocean had become a commercial and cultural highway.⁴

The first major European penetration of the Indian Ocean occurred at the end of the fifteenth century. "When Vasco da Gama sailed into the Indian Ocean in 1498, . . . he ushered in an era of foreign hegemony that was to last over four hundred years."⁵ While Portuguese, Dutch and French adventurers established temporary predominance for their respective states from time to time, power in the Indian Ocean ultimately shifted to England. General Michael Carver has described the genesis of this paramountcy.

In 1600, [Queen Elizabeth I] issued a privilege for 15 years to certain adventurers for the trade of the East Indies. This was the origin of the famous East India Company, the agency through which we traded, fought, and established our position east of Suez for 250 years. Its activities were gradually, and usually reluctantly, taken over by the British Government, but it continued to exercise most of the function of a government until

¹ Bab-el-Mandeb marks the southern boundary of the Red Sea. The Suez Canal, closed since 1967, marks the northern boundary.

² The Persian Gulf is of considerable economic, political and military interest to many nations of the world. It is an area rich in oil and has been hotly contested by interested parties. For an excellent background on this particular region, see David M. Abshire and Alvin J. Cottrell, *The Gulf: Implications of British Withdrawal* (Washington: The Center for Strategic and International Studies [Georgetown University], 1969).

³ Captain A. P. S. Bindra (Indian Navy), "Indian Ocean Vacuum: Fact or Fiction?" *NATO's Fifteen Nations* (March, 1971), p. 42.

⁴ Bindra, "The Indian Ocean as Seen by an Indian," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (May, 1970), pp. 180-181.

⁵ R. M. Burrell and Alvin J. Cottrell (editors), *The Indian Ocean: a Conference Report* (Washington: The Center for Strategic and International Studies [Georgetown University], March, 1971), p. 1.

1858, the Indian [Sepoy] mutiny being the final cause of its dissolution.⁶

Thereafter, British interest in the Indian Ocean was largely a function of British interest in the subcontinent.⁷ With the British withdrawal from India, the rationale for maintaining a significant British military presence in the Indian Ocean was weakened. Indeed, Carver has noted that

with the end of [the Indonesian-Malaysian] confrontation in Borneo in 1966, the opportunity had at last arrived to make that basic readjustment of our military position east of Suez that had been inherent in our departure from India in 1947. . . . Europe was definitely to come first, and no "special capability" was to be retained for operations east of Suez. . . . [British military forces] would withdraw totally not only from Singapore and Malaysia, but also from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971, leaving permanently east of Suez only the garrison of Hong Kong, slightly increased, two Royal Air Force air staging posts, and a naval radio station in the Indian Ocean.⁸

As active British interest in the area was declining, that of the United States and the Soviet Union was increasing. An examination of some of the military interests of both of these states is warranted.

THE AMERICAN MILITARY INTEREST

Like other nations, the United States maintains military forces to guarantee national security and as

a means of executing national and foreign policy. In order to achieve these aims, the United States maintains in the Indian Ocean both a strategic capability (in the form of ballistic missile firing submarines—the Polaris/Poseidon submarine force) and a conventional (non-nuclear) capability.

For the past 20 years, the United States has maintained a limited military presence in the Indian Ocean:

The U.S. Middle East Force (MEF) consists of a command ship [converted auxiliary seaplane tender] and two destroyers based at Bahrain in the Persian Gulf. The five main functions of U.S. forces in the East Indian Ocean are: showing the flag, protection and assistance to U.S. merchant shipping and maintenance of free passage in international waterways; evacuation operations; administration of military assistance programs; and communications and intelligence collection activities.⁹

This force is to be upgraded shortly. In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Alvin Cottrell of Georgetown University stated that the MEF "will soon be taken out of strike command, and I believe the seaplane tender will [be replaced by] a transport, which will be 14,000 tons and will be the flagship of the Commander, Middle East Force. So it will be upgrading not in the numbers of ships, but in the size of ships."¹⁰ Shortly after Cottrell's testimony, it was announced that the *USS Lasalle* will assume the duties of the flagship of the MEF.¹¹ The MEF, as currently configured, however, has been condemned as "near-ridiculous" by one representative in Congress. A more sanguine assessment, that the "principal value of the MEF is political," has also been expressed.

Aside from the MEF, there have been a number of other American military presences in the Indian Ocean. Each year, the CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) powers conduct a naval exercise called "Midlink." The American contribution to this exercise has usually been a squadron composed of an aircraft carrier, its screening destroyers and support ships.

During the recent Indo-Pakistani war, an American naval squadron composed of the *Enterprise* and its supporting warships entered the Bay of Bengal, ostensibly to prepare for the evacuation of American nationals should that eventuality have become necessary.¹²

Looking toward the future, effective January 1, 1972, the area of responsibility of the Commander in Chief, Pacific, was moved westward to embrace the entire Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.¹³ However, it remains an open question whether the United States will increase naval activities in the Indian Ocean in the near future. The demands on warships off the coast of Vietnam probably preclude extensive naval operations in the Indian Ocean for the present and the near future.

⁶ General Sir Michael Carver (British Army), "British Involvement East of Suez," *Military Review* (December, 1970), p. 23.

⁷ There were, of course, other subordinate interests. For example, with the shift from coal-fired to oil-fired ships, Britain wanted to maintain sea-lane communications with the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Even this, however, may be considered to some degree a function of Britain's relationship with India.

⁸ Carver, "British Military Involvement East of Suez," *op. cit.*, p. 35. The last named "naval radio station" is to be jointly operated with the United States at Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago (British Indian Ocean Territory) about 1,000 miles south of India.

⁹ Lieutenant Commander Beth F. Coye *et al.*, "An Evaluation of U.S. Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean," *Naval War College Review* (October, 1970), p. 46.

¹⁰ U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The Indian Ocean: Political and Strategic Future*, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 72.

¹¹ Ships of this type are usually used to transport amphibious forces and their associated equipment. *Lasalle*, however, will have no embarked Marines. Rather, the ship is being modified to perform better the functions of MEF described *supra* (e.g., evacuation operations).

¹² Other motives have been ascribed to the *Enterprise's* entry into the Bay of Bengal. For example, some commentators (notably those in India) considered the aircraft carrier's entry to have been a show of force in support of the Pakistani government.

¹³ There are two purely military reasons for this decision. The Suez Canal has been closed for over five years and the only way American warships can enter the Indian Ocean from the Atlantic is via the Cape of Good Hope, an extremely roundabout journey. Furthermore, should the canal be opened, it still could not accommodate the largest American aircraft carriers. The canal's 36-foot depth makes it too shallow for *USS Enterprise* (CVAN-65) and the eight carriers of the *USS Forrestal* (CVA-59) class.

Beyond the presence of naval units, there are a number of American military installations in countries that border the Indian Ocean.¹⁴ Kagnew Station, located on the outskirts of Asmara, Ethiopia, is a major communications relay facility. Likewise, the Harold E. Holt Communications Facility at Northwest Cape, Australia, provides a communications capability over large portions of the Indian Ocean. A third facility, one that will provide a link between Kagnew and Holt, is being constructed on the island of Diego Garcia.

In late 1966, London and Washington signed a 50-year agreement to develop a defense base [at Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago]; the U.S. would pay most of its cost and Britain would maintain only a token presence. For over four years, the matter rested there. But now, although the Nixon Administration is committed to a policy of lowering the U.S.'s military profile abroad and reducing its overseas base network, it has given the Navy a go-ahead to build a \$19 million communications post and 8,000-foot air strip on Diego Garcia.¹⁵

Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, the Chief of Naval Operations, has described the American facility at Diego Garcia as an "austere communications facility" which "will become part of the worldwide command and control network for normal and contingency operations in support of the national and naval operating requirements."¹⁶

Despite the limited capabilities that have been ascribed to the facility at Diego Garcia, there has been considerable speculation on other functions that the American facility might perform. Sometimes these have been expressed in general terms. For example, Colonel Heintz has quoted Admiral John McCain (formerly CINCPAC) to the effect that "as Malta [England's 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' during World War II] is to the Mediterranean, Diego Garcia is to the Indian Ocean."¹⁷ Brooke Nihart has com-

pared the Diego Garcia installation to the fleet anchorages (such as Ulithi) that the United States developed during World War II.¹⁸

On the other hand, more specific functions have been proposed. Heintz noted that

emphasis is being placed on Diego Garcia's function as a station for satellite communications in an area where U.S. coverage is poor. In addition, however, the atoll will back up (and could replace) our vitally important Kagnew station. . . . Diego Garcia will also help close the gap created when Pakistan required us to close down our communications monitoring station in that country.¹⁹

Heintz's views were reiterated a few months later during the Senate hearings on military construction authorization.

Diego Garcia might also serve as the home port of the Middle East Force. As noted above, this force is now homeported in the Persian Gulf. However, as the British complete their withdrawal from the gulf, the American position there may become unsettled.

THE SOVIET MILITARY INTEREST

Professor Paone of the U.S. Naval Academy has argued that "the nature of the Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean heartland is multidirectional. It is political, economic, and military."²⁰ Perhaps because the Soviet aim is "multidirectional," the explanations offered for Soviet interest in the region have been diverse.

Publicly, at least, the Soviets have argued that their presence in the Indian Ocean is essential in order to respond to American missile-firing submarines that might be deployed to that region. This argument, however, has certain drawbacks. Cottrell has noted that "the idea that the Soviet presence is merely a response to an American Polaris challenge would seem to lose some of its force . . . when it is remembered that the Soviet navy in the Indian Ocean has very little anti-submarine capability."²¹

The extent of Soviet penetration into the Indian Ocean has been a subject of considerable debate. Generally speaking, the debate is argued in terms of actual military presence (*i.e.*, the number of ships in the area) and in terms of the base rights and facility rights obtained for those ships. While the former may be determined fairly easily, the latter may not.²² Colonel Heintz has described the Soviet military presence in these terms:

Covering a strategic crescent from Ceylon to Tanzania, USSR task forces ranging in strength from six to 20 warships (including nuclear-missile cruisers and submarines) have cruised the Indian Ocean and shown the hammer-and-sickle in 20 major seaports in 14 countries on its shores. Russia now has marines, an ammunition depot, and a communications station on Socotra, an island belonging to anti-American South Yemen at the Indian Ocean gateway to the Red Sea. India, moreover, has allowed the USSR to establish a naval supply depot and

¹⁴ A number of countries have American MAAG (Military Assistance and Advisory Group) units. These, however, are not active combat units as are the warships of the MEF.

¹⁵ "The U.S. Navy Stakes out the Indian Ocean," *Business Week* (March 27, 1971), p. 66.

¹⁶ U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1972*, 92d Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), Part I, p. 997.

¹⁷ Colonel Robert D. Heintz, Jr., "U.S. Flag Over Diego Garcia: Challenging the Soviet Fleet," *Armed Forces Journal* (February 1, 1971), p. 13.

¹⁸ Brooke Nihart, "Indian Ocean Attracts Interest, U.S. Starts Base," *Armed Forces Journal* (April 5, 1971), p. 18.

¹⁹ Heintz, "U.S. Flag Over Diego Garcia: Challenging the Soviet Fleet," p. 13.

²⁰ Rocco M. Paone, "The Soviet Threat in the Indian Ocean," *Military Review* (December, 1970), p. 51.

²¹ Burrell and Cottrell, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

²² While the number of Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean can be counted, the meaning of their presence is not so obvious (*i.e.*, the intentions of the Soviet government in placing them in the Indian Ocean are not absolutely clear). It is the determination of Soviet intent that is the basic problem of Western policy makers and Kremlinologists.

an extensive "training" facility at Visakhapatnam on India's east coast, midway between Ceylon and Calcutta.²³

Colonel Heintz's assessment was echoed, to some degree, by the United States Navy. In testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, Admiral Zumwalt was asked by Representative Sikes (D.-Fla.) to provide an assessment of the Soviet presence. Admiral Zumwalt responded:

Since 1954, the USSR has offered some ----- in economic and military aid to 15 Indian Ocean littoral countries. This is approximately 65 percent of the Soviet Union's total aid to free world nations.

Focusing now on Soviet naval operations: they began in earnest in March 1968 shortly after the United Kingdom announcement of its planned withdrawal from East of Suez. Since then the Soviet navy has maintained an almost continuous presence in the Indian Ocean with an average of 3-4 naval combatants deployed at any given time. Soviet ships have made about 150 visits to 26 ports in 16 bordering countries. . . Soviet naval ship operating days in the Indian Ocean have risen from approximately 1,900 in 1968 to 3,400 in 1970.

The Soviets have not yet secured base rights in the area, but make extensive use of anchorages ----- The USSR has assisted in the development of port facilities ----- The present Soviet Indian Ocean fleet consists of a cruiser, destroyers, mine sweeper, [a landing ship, tank] with [marines], a repair shop and several other auxiliaries.²⁴

While, as Admiral Zumwalt's statement indicates, the official assessment of Soviet penetration is still partially classified, there are other indicators from both official and unofficial sources. They are, however, both conflicting and confusing. For example, Denis Warner, a leading Australian scholar in the areas of South and Southeast Asia, has written that "by arrangement with Southern Yemen, the Russians obtained permission to build a base on the island of Socotra, where 500 Russian technicians are said to be at work."²⁵ This was confirmed by C. L. Sulzberger of

*The New York Times*²⁶ and by Colonel Heintz.²⁷ On the other hand, in his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Ronald Spiers (Department of State) noted that

There has been publicity to the effect that Socotra was being developed as a Soviet base. We have no evidence that a naval base is being constructed there. As a matter of fact, it would not appear to make much sense as the Soviets do have access to the areas of Yemen and South Yemen generally. I am informed that high waves and the lack of a protected anchorage make the islands unsuitable as a naval base, and there is no evidence of efforts to develop facilities there.²⁸

Part of the problem may revolve about the definition of the term "base." Quite possibly, the Soviets do not envision development of major bases in the Indian Ocean comparable to the old British facility in Aden.

While much of the analysis of Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean reflects a concern for the status of Western powers and interests in that ocean, a limited case can be made for Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean as a "cockpit of Sino-Soviet rivalry."

In the Indian Ocean area, the confrontation is principally through Soviet support of India and Chinese support of Pakistan. Doubtless, . . . the reawakened Chinese would like to establish a strong position for themselves and way stations to Africa. The Chinese interest is not maritime, as the Soviet interest is in large part, but rather the extension of Chinese influence and where possible hegemony or even domination.²⁹

Cottrell envisioned Chinese interest in the area in terms of the doctrine of "people's war":

In many respects the Chinese Communists see the Indian Ocean in terms of an area in which exist "targets of opportunity" which reflect the theory of Lin Biao about using the so-called "countryside" or undeveloped and unstable areas of the world to outflank and defeat the "cities" or Western industrialized areas.³⁰

If this assessment is correct, the Chinese would of necessity come into rather serious conflict with the Russians. Whatever the goals of the latter may be, they require stable governments. Hence, it is most unlikely that the Soviets would encourage protracted rebellions in the countries in which they have ensconced themselves.³¹

THE LITTORAL STATES

Of the nations that are part of the Indian Ocean littoral, perhaps only three can deliver significant military power at considerable distance from home—the Republic of South Africa, Australia and India.

(Continued on page 228)

Edmund Joseph Gannon is a national defense analyst at the Library of Congress.

²³ Heintz, "U.S. Flag over Diego Garcia: Challenging the Soviet Fleet," p. 13.

²⁴ *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1972*, Part I, p. 998.

²⁵ Denis Warner, "Red Sails in the Indian Ocean Sunset," *Detroit News* (May 23, 1971).

²⁶ C. L. Sulzberger, "The Russians are Coming," *The New York Times* (May 5, 1971), p. 47.

²⁷ Heintz, "U.S. Flag Over Diego Garcia: Challenging the Soviet Fleet," p. 13.

²⁸ *The Indian Ocean: Political and Strategic Future*, p. 175.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

³¹ Indeed, the Soviets have gone to considerable lengths to defuse imbrolios that have developed. For example, Premier Aleksei Kosygin provided the good offices of the Soviet Union to mediate the dispute between Pakistan and India that had resulted in the fighting over the Rann of Kutch in 1965. Likewise, there is evidence that the Soviets will use their diplomatic clout to advance the interests of the nations which identify with the U.S.S.R. For example, the Soviet Union consistently vetoed any United Nations call for a cease-fire in East Pakistan in December, 1971, until the Indians had secured a decisive victory over the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Soviet-Indian Treaty of Friendship, 1971

On August 9, 1971, in New Delhi, representatives of the Soviet Union and India signed a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation. The full text of the treaty, as it appeared in New Times (Moscow), follows:

Wishing to expand and strengthen the existing relations of sincere friendship between them,

considering that the further development of friendship and cooperation meets the basic national interests of both states as well as the interests of a lasting peace in Asia and throughout the world,

being determined to contribute to strengthening world peace and security and to work tirelessly to bring about a relaxation of international tension and the final abolition of the remnants of colonialism,

reaffirming their firm belief in the principles of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between states with different political and social systems,

convinced that in the present-day world international problems can be solved only through cooperation and not through conflict,

reaffirming their determination to follow the objectives and principles of the United Nations Charter,

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the one hand, and the Republic of India, on the other, have decided to conclude the present Treaty and with this aim in view have appointed the following plenipotentiaries:

on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—the Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R. A. A. Gromyko,

on behalf of the Republic of India—the Minister of External Affairs of India Swaran Singh,

who, upon presentation of their credentials, found in due form and proper order, agreed on the following:

ARTICLE 1

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that there shall be a lasting peace and friendship between their two countries and their peoples. Each shall respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other and refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other Party. The High Contracting Parties shall continue to develop and strengthen the relations of sincere friendship, good-neighbourliness and all-round cooperation existing between them, on the basis of the above-mentioned principles as well as the principles of equality and mutual benefit.

ARTICLE 2

Guided by a desire to contribute in every way towards ensuring a lasting peace and the security of their peoples, the High Contracting Parties declare their determination to continue efforts towards maintaining and strengthening peace in Asia and throughout the world, ending the arms race and achieving general and complete disarmament covering both nuclear and conventional weapons under effective international control.

ARTICLE 3

Guided by their devotion to the lofty ideal of equality of all peoples and states, irrespective of race or creed, the High Contracting Parties condemn colonialism and racism in all forms and manifestations and reaffirm their determination to strive for their final and complete abolition.

The High Contracting Parties shall cooperate with other states in achieving these aims and to support the just aspirations of the peoples in their struggle against colonialism and racial domination.

ARTICLE 4

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India's policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this policy is an important factor for maintaining universal peace and international security and for easing tension in the world.

The Republic of India respects the peaceful policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation with all peoples.

ARTICLE 5

Being deeply interested in ensuring world peace and security, and attaching great importance to mutual cooperation in the international arena to achieve these aims, the High Contracting Parties shall maintain regular contacts with each other on major international problems affecting the interests of both states, through meetings and exchanges of opinion between their leading statesmen, visits by official delegations and special representatives of the two governments, and through diplomatic channels.

ARTICLE 6

Attaching great importance to economic, scientific and technical cooperation between them, the High Contracting Parties shall continue to strengthen and widen their mutually advantageous and all-round cooperation in these fields and also to expand their cooperation in the fields of trade, transport and communications on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual advantage and the most favoured nation principle in compliance with the existing agreements and special agreements with neighbouring countries, as it is stipulated in the trade agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and India of December 26, 1970.

ARTICLE 7

The High Contracting Parties shall promote the further development of the relations and contacts between them in the fields of science, art, literature, education, health care, the press, radio, television, cinema, tourism and sport.

ARTICLE 8

In accordance with the traditional friendship established between the two countries, each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or participate in any military alliances directed against the other Party.

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to refrain from any aggression against the other Party and not to allow the use of its territory for committing any act that may cause military damage to the other High Contracting Party.

ARTICLE 9

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to refrain from giving any assistance to any third Party taking part in an armed conflict with the other Party. In the event that any of the Parties is attacked or threatened with attack, the High Contracting Parties will immediately start mutual consultations with a view to eliminating this threat and taking appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security for their countries.

ARTICLE 10

Each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not undertake any commitment, secret or open, with regard to one or more states incompatible with the present Treaty. Each of the High Contracting Parties declares further that it has no commitments towards any other state or states and shall not undertake any commitments that may cause military damage to the other Party.

ARTICLE 11

The present Treaty is signed for a term of twenty years and shall be prolonged automatically for every subsequent period of five years unless one of the High Contracting Parties declares its intention to terminate its operation by notifying the other High Contracting Party 12 months before the expiration of the term of the Treaty.

The Treaty is subject to ratification and shall come into force on the day the instruments of ratification are exchanged, which will be effected in Moscow within one month after the signing of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 12

Any differences in interpreting any article or articles of the present Treaty that may arise between the High Contracting Parties shall be settled on a bilateral basis by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

The above-mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty in Russian, Hindi and English, all the texts being equally authentic, and affixed their seals thereto.

Done in New Delhi on August 9, 1971.

For the Union
of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

A. Gromyko, Minister
of Foreign Affairs

For the Republic
of India:

Swaran Singh, Minister
of External Affairs

Indian-Pakistani Accord, 1972

On July 3, 1972, at Simla, India, Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi signed an accord agreeing to end the conflict between them that began in December, 1971. The full text follows:

[1]

The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent, so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people.

In order to achieve this objective, the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan have agreed as follows:

I

That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the relations between the two countries.

II

That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organization, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations.

III

That the prerequisite for reconciliation, good neighborliness and durable peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful coexistence, respect for each

other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

IV

That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedeviled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by peaceful means.

V

That they shall always respect each other's national unity, territorial integrity, political independence and sovereign equality.

VI

That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they will refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other.

[2]

Both Governments will take steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed against each other. Both countries will encourage the dissemination of such information as would promote the development of friendly relations.

[3]

In order progressively to restore and normalize relations between the two countries step by step, it was agreed that:

I

Steps shall be taken to resume communications, postal, telegraphic, sea, land, including border posts, and air links, including overflights.

II

Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the other country.

III

Trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed as far as possible.

IV

Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted. In this connection delegations from the two countries will meet from time to time to work out the necessary details.

[4]

In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both the Governments agree that:

I

Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border.

II

In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally,

irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this line.

III

The withdrawals shall commence upon entry of this agreement and shall be completed within a period of thirty days thereof.

[5]

This agreement will be subjected to ratification by both countries in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures and will come into force with effect from the date on which the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

[6]

Both Governments agree that their respective heads will meet again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that, in the meanwhile, the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalization of relations, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of diplomatic relations.

President Nixon on South Asia, 1972

On February 9, 1972, President Richard Nixon sent Congress his report, "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace." Excerpts of the section describing American policy in South Asia follow:

The United States has had an enduring interest in the security, independence, and progress of both India and Pakistan. There have been fluctuations in our political relationships over the years—from our earliest ties with Pakistan in SEATO and CENTO, to our defense cooperation with India after the 1962 border war with China, to the Nixon Doctrine's posture of balance and restraint. But our fundamental interests and ties have been constant.

—India is a great country, a free and democratic nation, in whose future as a model of progress for the developing world the United States has invested its hopes and resources. India has been by far the principal beneficiary of U.S. development assistance—to the extent of approximately \$10 billion since its independence. In Fiscal Year 1971, this Administration provided \$540 million, or approximately two-thirds of the world's net development aid to India.

—The United States has long maintained a close tie also with Pakistan. Since its independence we have contributed almost \$4 billion to its economic development.

In 1971, these constructive relationships and shared hopes for progress were shaken by war.

The crisis began as an internal conflict in Pakistan. Pakistan's elections in December 1970 gave a majority in the National Assembly to the Awami League, a movement seeking substantial autonomy for the Bengalis of East Pakistan. When negotiations between the Government and the League on a formula for autonomy broke down at the end of March 1971, the Government ordered the army to suppress all separatist opposition. The League was banned; its leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was jailed for treason. As the army's campaign advanced in East Pakistan through spring and summer of 1971, countless thousands were killed, civil administration crumbled, famine threatened, and millions left their homes and fled to India.

The United States did not support or condone this military action. Immediately, in early April, we ceased issuing and renewing licenses for military shipments to Pakistan, we put a hold on arms that had been committed the year before, and we ceased new commitments for economic development loans. This shut off \$35 million worth of arms. Less than \$5 million worth of spare parts, already in the pipeline under earlier licenses, was shipped before the pipeline dried up completely by the beginning of November.

The crisis quickly acquired an international character. The flood of refugees was a tremendous burden on India's scarce resources and a threat to political stability in the Indian states into which the refugees poured. With support from India, a guerrilla movement developed in East Pakistan. Both countries moved their military forces to their common borders, and tensions mounted dangerously between them.

It was a foregone conclusion that if war broke out, India would win. But in our view war was neither inevitable nor acceptable.

We realized full well that there were objective limits to what the United States could do. South Asia was a region in which we had no preeminent position of influence. Tensions between Hindus and Moslems, and among the many feuding ethnic groups in this subcontinent of 700 million people, had endured for centuries. Nevertheless, because of our ties with both countries, in 1971 we were the only great power in a position to try to provide a political alternative to a military solution.

There were three levels of the crisis, and the United States addressed them all:

—The humanitarian problem of the Bengali refugees in India and the millions who remained in East Pakistan facing chaos and the threat of famine;

—The problem of political settlement between East and West Pakistan—the basic issue of the crisis;

—The danger of war between India and Pakistan, which grew week by week.

Throughout the summer, we refrained from public declarations but continued to express our concerns privately to all parties. It would have served neither India nor Bengali interests for us to alienate ourselves from the Government of Pakistan, whose policy and action were at the heart of the problem. This was explained again to the Government of India in July; its response was to express hope that our influence would produce results.

We obtained assurance from President Yahya that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman would not be executed. At our urging, Pakistan agreed to an internationalized relief presence in East Pakistan. We urged an amnesty for refugees of all creeds, replacement of the military governor of East Pakistan by a civilian, and a timetable for return to full civilian rule. Pakistan took all these steps. Return to civilian rule was pledged for the end of December and could have increased the chances for a political settlement and the release of Sheikh Mujib. Meanwhile, in August, we established contact with Bengali representatives in Calcutta. By early November, President Yahya told us he was prepared to begin negotiation with any representative of this group not charged with high crimes in Pakistan, or with Awami League leaders still in East Pakistan. In mid-November, we informed India that we were prepared to promote discussion of an explicit timetable for East Pakistani autonomy.

India was kept fully informed of all these developments at every stage. It indicated little interest. Meanwhile, India expanded its support of the guerrillas, and hostilities escalated along the eastern border.

The United States cannot be certain that the steps it proposed would have brought about a negotiation, or that such a negotiation would have produced a settlement. But it is clear that a political process was in train, which could have been supported and facilitated by all the parties involved if they had wished. This is the basis for the profound disappointment we felt and expressed when war erupted.

We had known the danger of war would increase toward the end of 1971, as weather conditions and India's military readiness improved and as the guerrilla forces completed training. In addition to humanitarian and political steps to provide alternatives to war, we sought directly to ease the military confrontation. In contacts in Washington and other capitals, in letters and face-to-face meetings with heads of government, foreign ministers, and ambassadors, we exerted our influence for restraint.

—To the Soviet Union, we made the point repeatedly over the summer that it behooved the two superpowers to be forces for peace. We asked the Soviet Union for its ideas on possible joint action.

—We continued to urge Pakistan to restore normal life in the East, and to put together a program of administrative and political steps that could stem the tide of refugees and lay a basis for a constitutional settlement.

—We told India that we attached the greatest importance to close U.S.-Indian relations, would do all we could to help with the burden of the refugees, but could only regard an Indian resort to armed attack as a tragic mistake. As early as August 11, Secretary Rogers told the Indian Ambassador that the Administration could not continue economic assistance to a nation that started a war.

As the tension along the border intensified in the fall, the United States proposed that both Indian and Pakistani troops pull back from the borders. Pakistan accepted this

proposal; India turned it down. UN Secretary General Thant placed his good offices at the disposal of both. Pakistan responded favorably, and in addition suggested the dispatch of UN observers to both sides of the border. India refused the Secretary General's offer, and declined to accept UN observers. The United States then proposed to Pakistan that it pull its forces back from the borders unilaterally, as a first step toward a mutual pullback. Pakistan accepted this idea, provided India would give some assurance that it would eventually reciprocate. India would not.

Time had run out on a peaceful solution. In late November, open war on a broad front erupted between India and Pakistan.

On December 4, the United States requested an urgent session of the UN Security Council, which voted, 11 to 2, for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of foreign forces. The USSR vetoed this and a second resolution soon after. A similar resolution then passed on December 7 in the General Assembly by 104 to 11, with 10 abstentions. Of all the nations of the UN, only the USSR, some of its East European allies, India, and Bhutan opposed it; our position was supported by the overwhelming majority of the nations of the world. The Soviet Union blocked international action until the capture of East Pakistan was a *fait accompli*.

Then, during the week of December 6, we received convincing evidence that India was seriously contemplating the seizure of Pakistan-held portions of Kashmir and the destruction of Pakistan's military forces in the West. We could not ignore the fact that when we repeatedly asked India and its supporters for clear assurances to the contrary, we did not receive them. We had to take action to prevent a wider war.

We could take a stand against the war and try to stop it, or we could maintain a "neutral" position and acquiesce in it. The former course meant strains in our relations with India, as well as the risk of failure. But the latter course, I concluded, ran even greater risks. Acquiescence had ominous implications for the survival of Pakistan, for the stability of many other countries in the world, for the integrity of international processes for keeping the peace, and for relations among the great powers. These risks were unacceptable.

If we had not taken a stand against the war, it would have been prolonged and the likelihood of an attack in the West greatly increased. It was not my view in the first place that war was the solution to a humanitarian problem. The complete disintegration by force of a member state was intolerable and could not be acquiesced in by the United Nations. The war had to be brought to a halt.

The global implications of this war were clear to the world community. The resort to military solutions, if accepted, would only tempt other nations in other delicately poised regions of tension to try the same. The credibility of international efforts to promote or guarantee regional peace in strife-torn regions would be undermined. The danger of war in the Middle East, in particular, would be measurably increased. Restraints would be weakened all around the world.

Internal ethnic conflicts and separatist strains, moreover, are a phenomenon of the contemporary world. India, more than most, has a heavy stake in the principle that such instabilities should not be exploited by other countries through subversion or resort to arms. The alternative is a formula for anarchy. The unanimity of Third World countries against this war was testimony to the universality of this concern.

Beyond this, there were implications for great-power relations.

Soviet policy, I regret to say, seemed to show the same tendency we have witnessed before in the 1967 Middle East war and the 1970 Jordanian crisis—to allow events to boil up toward crisis in the hope of political gain. The Soviet Union assured us that its August treaty of friendship with India was designed to strengthen its influence for peace. Whatever the intent, in retrospect it appears that the treaty, together with new arms deliveries and military consultations, gave India additional assurance of Soviet political support as the crisis mounted.

The United States, under the Nixon Doctrine, has struck a new balance between our international commitments and the increasing self-reliance of our friends; the Soviet Union in the 1970's is projecting a political and military presence without precedent into many new regions of the globe. Over the past three years, we have sought to encourage constructive trends in U.S.-Soviet relations. It would be dangerous to world peace if our efforts to promote a detente between the superpowers were interpreted as an opportunity for the strategic expansion of Soviet power. If we had failed to take a stand, such an interpretation could only have been encouraged, and the genuine relaxation of tensions we have been seeking could have been jeopardized.

Finally, it was our view that the war in South Asia was bound to have serious implications for the evolution of the policy of the People's Republic of China. That country's attitude toward the global system was certain to be profoundly influenced by its assessment of the principles by which this system was governed—whether force and threat ruled or whether restraint was the international standard.

These were our overwhelming concerns. They underlay our efforts to prevent war and our efforts to stop war when it broke out. They went to the heart of our responsibility as a great power.

The crisis of 1971 transformed South Asia. We enter 1972 acutely aware of the challenges the new conditions present.

Pakistan remains a close friend. Its people face the ordeal of rebuilding the society and economy of a shattered state. The United States stands ready to help.

Our relief effort in East Bengal will continue. The authorities face the grim challenge of creating a viable political structure and economy in one of the most impoverished—and now newly devastated—areas of the world. We have never been hostile to Bengali aspirations. Our aid program in the 1960's increasingly concentrated on development in East Bengal. We provided two-thirds of the world's emergency aid to the province in 1971. We would expect other nations to bear a proportionate share of that responsibility in the future, but as the United States strengthens new relationships in Asia, we have no intention of ignoring these 70 million people.

The United States, of course, has a tradition of friendship with India as well as with Pakistan. Our strong interest in Indian democracy and progress is not diminished.

It makes no sense to assume, however, that a country's democratic political system—or its size—requires our automatic agreement with every aspect of its foreign policy. We have our views and concerns in the world, just as India has its own. We disagreed with specific Indian actions in November and December, and we said so.

We did not expect this to be popular in India. Great nations like our two nations, however, do not make their policy on so ephemeral a basis. For this reason, we could not accept the argument that our criticism would drive India into the arms of the Soviet Union. India itself, we knew, had the strongest interest of all in its own democracy and nonalignment. And India and the Soviet Union already

had a political tie of a kind that the U.S. would not attempt to match. This tie—inherent in the expanding Soviet-Indian military supply relationship after 1965—originated long in advance of the November war, the August treaty of friendship, our July China initiative, or the March crisis in Pakistan. When the August treaty was signed, both sides told us that it had been in preparation for more than two years. Beyond this, in the 1971 crisis, the Soviet Union was willing to veto UN action and to make military moves to deter China on India's behalf. For the United States to compete with the Soviet Union in fueling an arms race, obstructing UN efforts to step a war, and threatening China, was out of the question.

We are prepared now for a serious dialogue with India on the future of our relations. We look forward to a fruitful discussion. This will depend not on an identity of policies, but on respect for each other's views and concerns.

Just as the success of Indian democracy and progress is important to us, we also have a continuing interest in India's independence and non-alignment. Thus our political as well as our economic relationship will naturally be the subject of our dialogue. If India has an interest in maintaining balanced relationships with all major powers, we are prepared to respond constructively. Of interest to us also will be the posture that South Asia's most powerful country now adopts toward its neighbors on the subcontinent.

I know that India will have its own issues to add to the agenda. India's basic policy choices are India's to make. We both . . . have an interest in finding common ground.

What will be the role of the great powers in the subcontinent's future? The 1971 crisis was bound to affect great-power relations. After my July 15 Peking summit announcement, and also during the diplomacy of the South Asian crisis, there was fanciful speculation of a U.S.-Chinese alignment. There is no such alignment; neither of my summit meetings is directed against any other action. And there were ample opportunities for the Soviet Union to help prevent the Pakistani political conflict from being turned into an international war.

A more constructive approach to great-power relations in South Asia—and elsewhere—will be one of the goals I hope to further in my discussions in both Peking and Moscow.

A tragic irony of 1971 was that the conflict in South Asia erupted against a background of major developments, global and regional, which had offered unprecedented hope:

—Globally, we could see the beginnings of a new relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China; concrete progress on important issues in U.S.-Soviet relations; a maturing relationship between the U.S. and East Asia as the Nixon Doctrine took effect and the U.S. sharply reduced its military involvement in Vietnam; the increasing contribution of Japan in Asian affairs; and efforts among industrialized nations to create new economic relationships increasing the trade opportunities of the developing world.

—Regionally, there were breakthroughs in economic development. The "Green Revolution" in agriculture was laying the basis for industrial development and steady growth. Trade earnings were financing an increasing proportion of development needs, strengthening economic and political self-reliance.

Our purpose now will be to recapture the momentum of these positive developments. The 700 million people of the subcontinent deserve a better future than the tragedy of 1971 seemed to portend. It is for them to fashion their own vision in the regional peace and stability which are the preconditions for their achieving it.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON SOUTH ASIA

INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS—1960–1965. By DINESH CHANDRA JHA. (Patna, India: Bharati Bhawan, 1972. 419 pages, appendices, bibliography and index, Rs. 30.00.)

The author of this well written book was educated in India and writes with a point of view sympathetic to India and the newly established state of Bangladesh. Mr. Jha has chosen to focus on the period 1960–1965 to “explore and analyze the stages by which Indo-Pakistan relations deteriorated from a point near amity to that of an open conflict. . . .” The partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 created numerous problems—border problems, minorities seeking special recognition, property problems connected with evacuees, and disputes over the distribution of vital water resources, particularly the flow of the Indus River.

Mr. Jha details the manner in which the tensions led to armed conflict between India and Pakistan in 1965. (In his appendix he includes a chronology of the period from 1960 to 1965 leading to the fighting in 1965.) He believes that the Tashkent Declaration of January, 1966, did not further friendly relations between the two countries, but only stabilized the positions of their armed forces. It is interesting to note that, writing about the 1965–1966 period, Mr. Jha says of the prospects for peace between India and Pakistan: “all that can be said for the present is that there is no possibility of any marked improvement in their relations. . . . The suspicion between them is too great, their attitudes have been too hard and inflexible, and public opinion in these two countries is so worked up that the governments are in no position to make any sudden or radical change in policies towards each other.” The end result of all this was the war between India and Pakistan which began and ended in December, 1971.

In his preface, the author includes a chronology with voluminous footnotes outlining a history of the period from 1966 through the summer of 1972. This includes the Indo-Pakistani War, which resulted in the establishment of Bangladesh as a separate country. The involvement in the quarrel of the United States, Russia and China is also detailed with reasonable objectivity. The addition of this updated preface adds greatly to the value of the study. Of the many recent books about Indo-Pakistan relations written by Asian authors this is one of the most scholarly and well written. O.E.S.

FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS: PAKISTAN 1962–1969. By HERBERT FELDMAN. (London: Oxford University Press, 1972. 340 pages, appendices and index, £5.50.)

Herbert Feldman writes about a period of Pakistani history covering the administration of Ayub Khan, beginning with the abrogation of martial law in June, 1962, and ending in April, 1969, when Ayub's successor, Yahya Khan, had all Ayub's official photographs removed from government offices and replaced with his own. Yahya Khan subsequently instituted martial law, replacing Ayub's presidential system.

The author writes of the rise of Ayub Khan's personal prestige and power, which reached its height in 1965, and the gradual erosion of his stature following the 1965 undeclared war with India.

Mr. Feldman believes that the total identification of Ayub Khan with the administration of the country “inevitably placed upon him a personal liability for everything that happened, and especially for everything bad.”

The author gives an interesting and unbiased account of Pakistan's personalities and politics during a short and important period. O.E.S.

THE RISE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN CEYLON. By VISAKHA KUMARI JAYAWARDENA. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1972. 382 pages, bibliography and index, \$10.75.)

The author, a Senior Lecturer in Economics at the University of Ceylon, has written a study relating the origin and evolution of the labor movement in Ceylon to changes in Ceylon's economic and social structure in the years 1880–1933.

This is an interesting and detailed account of the era during which Ceylon was slowly becoming a modern nation. O.E.S.

INDIA-PAKISTAN: THE HISTORY OF UNSOLVED CONFLICTS. By LARS BLINKENBERG. (Copenhagen and Aarhus, Denmark: Dansk Undenrigspolitisk Instituts, 1972. 440 pages, maps, bibliography and index, 75 Dan. Kr.)

This is an excellent historical and political analysis of the India-Pakistan conflict from the partition to the present, with particular focus on Kashmir and Bangladesh. Both the bilateral relations of the nations and their relations with China, the U.S.S.R. and the West are brought into perspective. M.M.A.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE NEW ORDER IN ASIA

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limited; but they became closer in 1970-1971, at a time when Pakistan was going through the agony that led to a bloody civil war, a war with India, the fall of a discredited regime, and the break-up of the nation. The United States should maintain friendly relations with what is left of Pakistan, which is an important member of the family of nations, and which is now in a receptive, if guarded, mood regarding foreign contacts. It should encourage steps toward the establishment of a more representative political system in Pakistan and toward the improvement of Indo-Pakistani relations; but it should not interfere directly in the affairs of the subcontinent, and it should not repeat the mistake of "tilting" toward Pakistan at the expense of its relations with India and with the new nation of Bangladesh.

Bangladesh is trying to build a new state after her long ordeal, amid appalling human conditions, with a weak political, economic and social base. But she has a popular leader, Mujibur Rahman, and a great deal of determination to survive, after the heavy sacrifices she made for her independence. Bangladesh needs a vast amount of international assistance, which has been coming after a disappointingly slow start. Fortunately the United States, after some hesitation, extended recognition to Bangladesh in early April, 1972, and official and unofficial American agencies, through bilateral and multilateral channels, are already heavily involved in assistance and relief work in the new state. While the leaders and people of Bangladesh cannot forget that the United States followed policies that were detrimental to them during their fearful ordeal after March 25, 1971, and while they harbor no affection for President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, their attitude toward the American people and toward the United States generally is surprisingly good. If the United States gives both tangible and intangible encouragement and support to Bangladesh in the early stages of her survival and nation-building efforts, official and unofficial relations may become satisfactory and fairly extensive. Bangladesh should be on the conscience of the American people, and the United States should demonstrate its genuine interest in and its goodwill for the people of the new state.

By a fundamental reappraisal and reorientation of its South Asian policies, the United States can and should develop a new approach to South Asia, an approach that will be more in tune with the new forces and the new order in that part of the world, and therefore more genuinely supportive of larger American national interests.

POPULATION PRESSURES IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

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IUD and sterilization totals in 1970 were only 54 per cent and 47 per cent respectively, of the 1968 totals. Although these losses may have been offset somewhat by the distribution of approximately 500 million units of conventional contraceptives, it is clear that the momentum of the program was not sustained throughout the period—administrative and demographic goals were not fully realized.

Recognizing these difficulties, the fourth five year plan (1970-1975) called for an allocation of Rs. 606 million (\$127 million), and recommended (a) the inclusion of oral contraceptives and (b) a greater emphasis on female sterilization in the program. Obviously, such routine adjustments are not going to produce the needed results.

On balance, then, one can certainly agree that the Pakistan Family Planning Program—working under difficult circumstances in a predominantly agrarian and traditional society—made substantial progress between 1965 and 1971. Yet its goals were not achieved, and it is unlikely that they could have been within the existing program. In short, on June 16, 1971, a significant decline in fertility was neither an immediate nor a proximate prospect in Pakistan. On June 18, with the independence of Bangladesh, that prospect became even more remote.

POSTSCRIPT: PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH

While there is no reason to doubt the "good intentions" of either Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto or Bangladesh President Mujibur Rahman, it is clear that the recent war completely disrupted the domestic life of both nations, leaving the respective leaders preoccupied with immediate problems of restoration rather than reform. Under these circumstances, it is hard to see how the prewar family planning programs can even be fully restored, no less radically expanded, in the foreseeable future.

MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

(Continued from page 221)

The primary military interests of South Africa, however, lie within Africa itself. The black governments to the north are openly hostile to South Africa's continuation of white minority rule. Presumably, therefore, South African military interests will continue to be correlated with her relationships with the other governments of sub-Saharan Africa.

Australia's major military (and, for that matter, economic) interests since the end of World War II have been largely concentrated on the Pacific Ocean

powers, specifically Japan and the United States.³² Thus, while Australia possesses the military hardware necessary to conduct military operations at considerable distance from home,³³ there appears to be no current interest in expanding operations in the Indian Ocean area beyond the current low level.³⁴

It would thus appear that only India remains as a "significant military power" whose interests potentially extend into the Indian Ocean.³⁵ However, there are a number of factors which militate against India's active involvement far from her own territory. China remains a danger to Indian security. Pakistan remains an enemy, despite a slight thaw in Indo-Pakistani relations. The creation of Bangladesh does not necessarily mean the end of tension in that part of the Bay of Bengal. Furthermore, over the next decade the Bengali portions of India may become *Bangladesh irridenta*. Given the conditions that prevail in Bangladesh today, this might appear most unlikely; however, conditions may change markedly in ten years. Considering these factors, it would appear unlikely that India would find extensive military operations beyond the subcontinent attractive.

A number of proposals have been made over the past few years by various powers regarding the future of the Indian Ocean. Some have called for neutralization of the Indian Ocean; others have called for a nuclear-free zone (similar to that established by the Antarctica Treaty). Recommendations have been made for the withdrawal of American military forces from the Indian Ocean; recommendations have been made for significantly increasing them. The establishment of the Diego Garcia installation has likewise generated both substantial opposition and support.

³² An Australian military contingent served in Vietnam against Communist insurgents. To at least some extent this was the result of American influence on the Australian government.

³³ The Australian navy has an aircraft carrier, a former aircraft carrier (now a transport) that can still operate helicopters, 14 destroyers and 4 submarines.

³⁴ Australian forces are now serving in Papua and New Guinea. Furthermore, there is a regiment stationed in Singapore.

³⁵ At present, the Indian Navy is made up of an aircraft carrier, two cruisers, 24 destroyers and destroyer escorts, and four submarines.

³⁶ "Statement on the Indian Ocean, United Nations, and other Topics from the Conference of Nonaligned Countries" [Lusaka, Zambia, September 8-10, 1970], *The Indian Ocean: Political and Strategic Future*, p. 204.

³⁷ Niu Sien-Chong, "The Strategic Outlook of the Indian Ocean," *NATO's Fifteen Nations* (March, 1971), p. 38.

³⁸ *The Indian Ocean: Political and Strategic Future*, p. 149.

³⁹ As a corollary, there might well be a rearrangement of the littoral states into mutually antagonistic camps. For example, before the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the Pakistanis were apprehensive over growing Indian naval strength. Burrell and Cottrell noted that "The possibility of the Indian Navy receiving help from an outside power has alarmed the Pakistani government. In order to counteract this potential Indian threat, the Pakistani government has tentatively begun to pursue a more active policy of seeking naval cooperation with its western neighbor, Iran," *op. cit.*, p. 51.

The Lusaka Conference of Nonaligned States recommended in 1970 that the Indian Ocean be declared a zone of peace.

A Declaration would be adopted calling upon all States to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which great power rivalries and competition, either army, navy, or air force bases, are excluded. The area should also be free of nuclear weapon.³⁶

Neutralization is probably a long-term Indian goal. "The Indian Government's policy on the Indian Ocean is that the whole area should be left alone and no superpower should come in."³⁷

The ideal of Indian Ocean neutralization is certainly not limited to India. The support of neutralization by the Lusaka Conference is proof of that.

Not all Indian Ocean powers necessarily believe that neutralization would be an unalloyed benefit. Professor Norman Palmer of the University of Pennsylvania described this viewpoint:

A common theme is this: We don't want the great powers around, but for so many decades [have] had great powers around, so we really haven't had much experience in operating on our own. We are not quite sure what the consequences would be. Take an admittedly untypical case, leader Lee Kuan [Yew] of Singapore. He likes to analyze factors of this sort. He often presents the view that it is difficult for the Asian countries to deal with their internal problems and to cooperate with each other. He is not at all sure that a major source of these tensions arises from nefarious activities of the great powers.³⁸

An example of this thinking might well be the recent war on the subcontinent. With the possible exception of the American squadron which entered the Bay of Bengal (but took no part in the fighting), there was no great power participation in that war. Nonetheless, the Indian Navy exercised supremacy in those waters and effectively cut off any attempt on the part of the Pakistanis to relieve their beleaguered forces. In the absence of the great powers, the strongest local navies and air forces could exercise at least a limited dominion over the Indian Ocean area just as India did over the waters adjacent to the subcontinent.³⁹

Since the Indo-Pakistani rivalry and others like it have their origins outside of the Western presence in the Indian Ocean, it is most unlikely that a complete Western absence would ameliorate them. Western departure may even exacerbate those difficulties. It is difficult, if not impossible, to predict with any accuracy the likely course of military events over the next decade or so in the Indian Ocean. The area will probably remain volatile. The enmities are ancient. The interests of the great powers intrude and will continue to do so in all likelihood. Considering these factors, among others, the chance of an outbreak of armed conflict in the Indian Ocean area remains unpleasantly high.

SRI LANKA TODAY

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government which first entered into the Ceylon-China Rubber Rice Agreement in 1953. This fear of Indian "expansionism" has been the unspoken bedrock of the thinking of both major parties in the island, the SLFP as well as the UNP.⁴

Although at times the bogey of Indian expansionism has been a useful political diversion to distract the popular wrath from the domestic inadequacies of the government, there is no doubt that the Indian "presence" inside the island and across the Palk Straits, taking diverse forms, has been oppressive to the small neighbor, not without some justification. The Tamil minority in Sri Lanka has made no secret of wanting to join its counterpart racial community in Tamil Nadu in South India. If there has not been an action-oriented reciprocity to these sentiments from Tamil Nadu, it is essentially because of New Delhi's ability to hold in check this spill-over of subnational sentiments across the Palk Straits.

Under these circumstances, how can one envisage the response of Ceylon to the new power configuration at the global as well as the regional level? In the context of the United States-China détente, the thaw in United States-Ceylon relations may continue, more so in the wake of the Indo-Soviet treaty. With the Soviet Union (whose alliance with India has caused Ceylon's foreign policy strategists much anxiety), Ceylon may develop a relationship with reservations.

At the regional level, can one envisage an initiative on the part of Ceylon to bring the small countries together vis-à-vis India, as suggested in a recent editorial of the English daily, *Ceylon Daily News*? Attractive as the idea may seem, it may not be feasible in the near future in view of the recent developments in Nepal-Indian relations and the close ties of Bangladesh with India. As in the past, Ceylon may continue to maintain close and cordial relationships with Pakistan. The complementary nature of the economies of the two countries, coupled with identical political interests, make this easier. This is evident from the recent Rs.45 million Sri Lanka-Pakistani barter agreement under which Sri Lanka will sell her tea for cotton yarn, pulses and grains from Pakistan.

The relationship between India and Sri Lanka is likely to continue to be one of watchful cordiality. There has been considerable talk of India-Sri Lanka cooperation in the economic field, but despite a great deal of spadework, a major break-through seems to be a long way off. The physical nearness of India to Sri Lanka as well as many cross-cultural and economic

links between the two countries seem to be constraining rather than helpful factors in fostering a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship. Perhaps an upsurge of self-confidence in Sri Lanka might induce her to overcome some of the psychological imponderables that beset relationships between a big country and a small one, geographically set in close proximity.

THE RESURGENCE OF INDIA

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peaceful settlement. American officials contended that India knew of Pakistan's willingness to compromise as a result of American initiatives. In a letter to President Nixon, Prime Minister Gandhi argued instead that war could have been avoided if the United States had used its power and influence to force Pakistani concessions. In addition, Indian officials were disturbed by the failure of the United States and other critics to appreciate the rectitude of the Bengali cause. The Indians had deeply resented what they considered the paltry American contribution to refugee relief. In January, columnist Jack Anderson published secret State Department documents written in early December; Anderson's revelations reinforced Indian disenchantment with the United States. The documents revealed President Nixon's determination to avoid being "even-handed" in the conflict and instead to follow a "get tough" policy toward India.¹³

Yet the United States and China can only accept the *fait accompli* of India's military victory. And the general trends in Indian relations with those two powers may have been only temporarily diverted by the December war. For the last several years, there have been signs of Chinese interest in improving relations with India as a means of balancing Russian influence.¹⁴ China's mild response to the Indo-Soviet treaty and the Indo-Pakistani war suggest that Peking's goals have not been altered. While the United States reacted more vigorously to the Indian military action, the promise of the Nixon Doctrine and the prospective Washington-Peking détente indicate that long-term American policy will probably be oriented toward improving relations with India and deemphasizing military alliances.

India's firm but accommodating policy toward Pakistan since December has reassured the United States. Ignoring the call of some groups to continue the fighting in the west and to force the Pakistanis out of the disputed state of Kashmir, Mrs. Gandhi instead sought to establish a dialogue with the Paki-

⁴ Pertinax, "Ceylon's Non Alignment after the Indo-Pak War: Can SWRD's Dynamic Neutralism Flourish Today?" *Tribune*, vol. 17, no. 29, May 20, 1972, p. 11.

¹³ M. S. Rajan, "Bangladesh and After," *Pacific Affairs*, 45 (Summer, 1972), 197-200; *The New York Times*, January 1, 1972, p. 2; *ibid.*, January 4, 1972, p. 10; *ibid.*, January 6, 1972, p. 16.

¹⁴ Mira Sinha, "China and the Indo-Soviet Treaty," *India Quarterly*, 27 (October-December, 1971), 337-343.

stani government now headed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. While the Gandhi-Bhutto meetings of late June, 1972, produced no dramatic results, it appeared that the two leaders might be on the verge of resolving the 25-year dispute over Kashmir.

DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

While India's international position is now secure, the New Congress party's performance at home will determine the duration of this third phase of recent Indian history. The improved performance of the economy may provide the base necessary for implementing reforms. During the late 1960's, India experienced the "green revolution," marked by an impressive increase in production, especially of wheat and, to a lesser extent, of rice. The success of the Indian government in introducing high yield varieties of wheat and rice underlined the Indian peasants' willingness to accept change. Many foreign as well as Indian observers have argued that the Indian farmer was too bound by tradition to adopt improved agricultural practices. The "green revolution" as well as recent studies of village life confirm that change, not stagnation, characterizes rural India. Industrial productivity and national income have been increasing at annual rates of five per cent. Industrial growth must be stimulated, but investment capital remains scarce. Foreign assistance has decreased, while Indian resources must be diverted to paying the large international loans contracted over the past 20 years.¹⁵

The public buoyancy resulting from the national victory of December, 1971, gives the government of Indira Gandhi a few years to confront these domestic problems. To preserve Indian unity, the New Congress must achieve significant economic development and carry out the promises of the Indian constitution and the 1971 electoral campaign to provide for the social and economic welfare of India's five hundred million people.

¹⁵ John Adams, "Agricultural Growth and Rural Change in India," *Pacific Affairs*, 43 (Summer, 1970), 189-202; Harry W. Blair, "The Green Revolution and 'Economic Man': Some Lessons for Community Development in South Asia," *ibid.*, 44 (Fall, 1971), 353-367; *Economist*, June 12, 1971, pp. 67-68.

PAKISTAN UNDER BHUTTO

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established without further delay. Pakistan's insistence on talks before recognition and the refusal of Bangladesh to agree to such talks have created an impasse. But efforts to find a way out must continue.

U.S.-PAKISTANI RELATIONS

Pakistan's relations with the United States have become more intimate. The estrangement of the

mid-1960's has given way to a renewed understanding based on an underlying identity of views on the problems which confront the subcontinent. American policy towards Pakistan during the 1971 crisis in East Pakistan was decidedly sympathetic. Throughout the long and difficult months of the civil war in East Pakistan, Washington tried to bring about a political settlement among the three contending parties and to defuse the mounting tensions on the Indo-Pakistani borders. Although Washington's efforts to promote a negotiated settlement proved abortive, its role in the Indo-Pakistani war was direct and decisive. It sponsored the cease-fire resolutions in the U.N. Security Council and the General Assembly, and forced India through the Soviet Union into agreeing to the cease-fire in West Pakistan.⁸

The two irritants in Pak-American relations in the 1960's were Pakistan's *entente cordiale* with China and Indo-American collaboration consequent upon the Sino-Indian War of 1962. The suspension of United States military aid to Pakistan in 1965 and its total discontinuance in 1967 further weakened the rationale of Islamabad's alliance with Washington. The discontinuance of American military aid compelled Pakistan to look to the Soviet Union for the fulfilment of her defense requirements. This, in turn, weaned Pakistan away from the United States and, in 1968, prompted the decision not to renew the lease on the communications base at Badebar.

The dramatic change in United States policy towards China set in motion a series of developments which have had a profound impact on United States-Pakistani relations. The new policy removed one of the major points of discord between them. It also brought to an abrupt end the parallelism in Indo-Soviet and American policies towards China and directly led to the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. To offset the danger posed by the Indo-Soviet alliance, Pakistan is anxious to establish closer links with the United States. Bhutto has called for the reactivation of the Mutual Security Agreement of the 1950's and the replacement of American equipment destroyed during the course of the 1971 war with India.⁹

However, there is no disposition on the part of the United States to negotiate a new military agreement with Pakistan; this was categorically affirmed by a State Department spokesman when he was asked to comment on Bhutto's statement.¹⁰ The Nixon Doctrine envisages a conscious curtailment of the United

⁸ In an address to the National Assembly, Bhutto affirmed that the deployment of the United States Seventh Fleet in the Bay of Bengal was an important factor in forcing India to agree to a cease-fire on the Western front. *The Pakistan Times*, July 18, 1972.

⁹ This was stated by Bhutto in an interview to the correspondent of *The New York Times*; see *Dawn*, Karachi, February 14, 1972.

¹⁰ *Dawn*, Karachi, February 16, 1972.

States military role and its commitments in Asia; after the American military disengagement from Vietnam, there is bound to be a further narrowing and sharpening of American interests in the Asian land mass. The role of the United States in the Asian power balance will be more economic and diplomatic than military. It is, therefore, difficult to predict the extent to which the United States will be willing to reciprocate Pakistan's desire for closer links. Given the power environment in South Asia, American attitudes may be conditioned largely by the nature and degree of Soviet involvement in India and the latter's ability, or inability, to maintain balanced relations with the two superpowers. If New Delhi decides to strengthen and develop further its alliance with Moscow, Washington may find it expedient to support Islamabad. Alternatively, if India plays down the implications of her 1971 treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union and successfully maintains an equipoise in her relations with the two superpowers, the United States may avoid a special relationship with Pakistan.

RELATIONS WITH CHINA

Sino-Pakistani relations continue to be close. China extended unqualified diplomatic support to Pakistan during the war, having given substantial military equipment in the preceding months. Chinese support was friendly but cautious in the initial period of the crisis; it grew stronger and more outgoing after the Indo-Soviet Treaty but fell short of military intervention. The situation on the Sino-Soviet borders and the Indo-Soviet Treaty immobilized China's military role in the war. In addition, China had always been in favor of negotiations and a peaceful settlement of the crisis in East Pakistan and the Indo-Pakistani dispute linked with it. During Bhutto's visit to Peking in November, 1971, Chi Peng-fei, acting Foreign Minister, stated that "disputes between states should be settled through consultations and not by resorting to force."¹¹

By unmasking Soviet expansionist designs in South Asia, the 1971 war has reinforced the need for continued collaboration between Pakistan and China. Despite Pakistan's curtailed size and importance, she can still act as a balancing factor against India and the Soviet Union. With the change in the military balance on the subcontinent (consequent upon the Indo-Pakistani War), the threat to Sinkiang-Tibet has grown and a new critical situation has arisen for China. If one examines more precisely the geostrategic situation in the border area south of Sinkiang, the reason for a Sino-Pakistani identity of interests becomes obvious. In that area, northern Kashmir

forms a land bridge between Pakistan and China. The opening of the "silk route" connecting Gilgit in Kashmir and Kashghar in Sinkiang in 1970 has brightened the prospect of further cooperation between them. China's security requirements are directly affected by further developments in South Asia. She will, therefore, help Pakistan to get over her defeat by India and, with regenerated military forces, enable her to act as a check against India and the Soviet Union.¹²

THE SOVIET UNION

Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union have been far from satisfactory in the past year and may continue to be intractable. Soviet diplomatic activity in South Asia has led to renewed big power interest in the region. The Soviet Union's defense pact with India has upset the power equilibrium on the subcontinent and has ended the supervisory role in Indo-Pakistani affairs which the Soviets played with consummate skill after Tashkent. During the 1971 crisis in East Pakistan, Soviet policy was openly hostile to Pakistan and constituted an unwarranted interference in her domestic affairs.

The Soviet Union extended unqualified support to the Awami League and tried to pressure Pakistan in a number of ways. Economic aid was suspended, and Russian experts working on various projects were recalled. Military aid to India was sharply expanded. With the outbreak of the war, unequivocal military and diplomatic backing was given to India. By its repeated use of the veto, the Soviet Union successfully frustrated all the efforts of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities and to effect the withdrawal of Indian troops from East Pakistan. Soviet maneuvers to prevent direct Chinese intervention were aimed at ensuring Indian victory and bringing about the breakup of Pakistan.

Notwithstanding the Indo-centric policy of the Soviet Union, Pakistan cannot afford to antagonize the Soviet Union openly and will have to exert maximum diplomatic effort to blunt Soviet hostility even if she cannot win Soviet friendship. The Soviet Union has acquired a hegemonial position in India and Afghanistan—the two neighbors with whom Pakistan has outstanding disputes. The Soviet Union can encourage the irredentist claims of both these countries against Pakistan and provoke recurring tensions on both sides of the Pakistani border. In the immediate framework of Indo-Pakistani relations, it is imperative for Pakistan to mollify the hostility of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is the only country which can influence victorious India to adopt an accommodating policy towards her vanquished neighbor. On the questions of the repatriation of the prisoners of war and the war crimes trial which Bangladesh insists on holding, Moscow, by virtue of

¹¹ *Peking Review*, November 12, 1971, p. 5.

¹² Fred Sanger, "On Both Sides of the Soviet-Chinese Border," *Aussen Politik*, Vol. 23 (2nd Quarter, 1972), p. 174.

its pervasive influence in Dacca and Delhi, can help to promote a mutually acceptable settlement.

Impelled by these considerations, Bhutto has expediently overlooked the Kremlin's role in the dismemberment of Pakistan. In March, 1972, he traveled to Moscow to work out some consensus with regard to Soviet-Pakistani bilateral relations and the whole subject of a political settlement on the subcontinent. Although his visit led to the restoration of trade, economic, scientific, technological and other ties, there was considerable disagreement on the South Asian political situation. The Soviet Union continues to be interested in sponsoring a security pact in Asia to which Pakistan cannot accede, given her friendship with Peking. Pakistan is the missing link in the Soviet Union's *cordon sanitaire* round China. It will thus be in the Soviet interest to reduce and limit Pakistan's influence in South and Western Asia. The Soviet Union will try to bring about the normalization of Indo-Pakistani relations in such a way that a degree of interdependence is created between them which will eventuate in India's domination over Pakistan. This explains the frequent use of the phrase "states of Hindoostan" by Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin during the Pakistani President's visit to the Soviet Union. Another way of restricting Islamabad's role in South Asian affairs would be to try to promote regional dissensions in Pakistan which will inhibit her from playing an active part in developments in South Asia. Afghanistan is an effective weapon through which Moscow can promote unrest. Radio Afghanistan has, of late, stepped up propaganda on Pakhtunistan; the Afghans are also active in the tribal belt. The leaders in the Kremlin can thus, by various means, chasten and subdue Pakistan.

Pakistan's ability to resist Soviet pressures will depend largely on the extent to which China and the United States help her to resist. The attitude of the Muslim countries will be another significant factor.

A new order is slowly emerging from the ruins of the old order in Pakistan. Despite formidable problems, the government has taken its first hesitant steps toward democracy and is indecisively edging in the direction of a more equitable economic system. Foreign policy is also being reoriented to meet the challenge of the changed power balance. The present leaders must try to jolt the Pakistani people out of the despondency and frustration arising from the defeat and humiliation of 1971.

BANGLADESH

(Continued from page 209)

total between 3 million and 4 million tons. And while some progress has been made since the December war in rebuilding her waterways and rail services and her 700 miles of roads, to move the grain imposes a great strain on her entire transport system which was in-

adequate even prior to the war.

Mujib's problems are also political. Bangladesh's new army, the Mukti Bahini, has less than 100,000 men, and cannot be expected to police all the villages. Political instability is threatened by the Maoist left-wing extremists, who are impatient with Mujib's moderate socialism. A large-scale bloodbath against the 1.5 million Biharis in Bangladesh may be hard to prevent. The Maoists in the guerrilla movement do not constitute a potent political force, as long as Mujib can point to some success in his efforts at national reconstruction. But if he fails in this task, the Bengali extremists could seize political leadership, and might join with West Bengal's Communists to form a united Bengal in a new revolutionary state.

A longer-term problem is that of excess population. With the return of the majority of refugees, 75 million people occupy the 55,000 square miles of Bangladesh, an area about equal to the size of Wisconsin. With a recent population growth of 3.4 per cent annually, Bangladesh might have more than 100 million people by 1980. She is already the world's eighth largest nation, and population growth could easily nullify all efforts at nation-building.

On the hopeful side, independent Bangladesh has a better chance to survive economically than she had under West Pakistan. As part of Pakistan, Bengali farmers and factory workers saw little incentive in producing more. Bangladesh has a large potential supply of natural gas, both for export and home use. Opening commercial relations with West Bengal will end the economically harmful effects of partition for both countries. Fish and jute can be shipped to West Bengal, whose steel, limestone and coal can be exported to Bangladesh. Joint control over floods and cyclones that devastated the rivers they share in common will now be possible, to their mutual benefit. And the manufactured goods that East Pakistan was forced to buy from West Pakistan can now be obtained from India, in some cases at more favorable prices.

Agricultural reconstruction was the top priority in Mujib's \$75-million development plan for the first half of 1972. Agriculture is expected to show some degree of recovery by early 1973. Development of high-yield rice offers ground for hope.

India has pledged to offer goods worth \$80 million, and has already rebuilt many of the 300 bridges destroyed in the war. The United Nations has appealed for \$565 million this year, and the total United States contribution for the first six months of 1972 totaled \$276.5 million, including food and logistic support, economic assistance, and grants to voluntary agencies.

But with a population increase, a restive populace, Soviet influence on the rise, and industry only slowly emerging, the future of Bangladesh is highly uncertain. The next two years will be crucial for her economic and political viability.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of September, 1972, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Disarmament

Sept. 7—The 25-nation Disarmament Conference ends its sessions in Geneva; no progress is reported towards an agreement to scrap chemical weapons and ban all nuclear arms testing.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

(See Norway, Denmark)

Hijacking

Sept. 5—A 17-nation conference in Washington rejects an international anti-hijacking treaty proposed by the U.S. and Canada. A French proposal to write a new treaty is accepted by the delegates.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)

Sept. 17—The annual report of the World Bank, issued today in Washington, reports that despite billions of dollars of foreign aid "it is probably true that the world's burden of poverty is increasing rather than decreasing."

Middle East Crisis

Sept. 5—In an early morning raid on the Olympic village in Munich, West Germany, Arab commandos of the Black September organization seize the building housing 26 Israeli athletes, killing 2 Israelis and holding 9 as hostages. All-day negotiations fail. The 9 hostages are subsequently killed by the commandos after their arrival by helicopter at Furstenfelbrucke Military Airbase where West German authorities fail in an attempt at rescue. Five guerrillas are also killed and 3 are captured.

Sept. 6—The Israeli government warns Palestinian guerrilla organizations that they will be held accountable for the slaying of the 11 Israelis.

Sept. 7—2 Israeli raids across the Lebanese border are reported by Lebanese military spokesmen.

Sept. 8—Israeli planes raid 10 Arab guerrilla bases in Syria and Lebanon simultaneously, according to Israeli sources, in reprisal for the slaying of the 11 Israeli Olympians. The Israeli raids were the most extensive since the 6-day war in 1967.

Sept. 16—Israeli and Lebanese sources report a heavy

attack by Israeli armored units across southern Lebanon in an Israeli attempt to root out Arab guerrilla bases.

Sept. 17—Israeli army spokesmen report the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon after a raid kills "at least 60" Arab guerrillas.

Lebanon orders the Palestinian Al Fatah organization to evacuate all villages in southern Lebanon.

Sept. 18—Lebanese sources report that the Lebanese army is increasing its forces in southern Lebanon to inhibit Arab commando activity along the Israeli front.

Sept. 19—A bomb sent through the mail explodes in the Israeli Embassy in London, killing the Israeli agricultural counselor, Ami Shachori, and wounding his replacement, Theodor Kaddar.

Sept. 20—2 synagogues in Buenos Aires, Argentina, are heavily damaged by bomb explosions.

Sept. 21—Envelopes mailed from Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and addressed to Israeli officials, are discovered in at least 6 cities abroad and 3 in the U.S. The envelopes contain explosive devices. Arab terrorists are thought to be responsible.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Sept. 22—The 2-day operation, "Strong Express," by members of NATO, involving 65,000 men, 300 ships and 700 aircraft, ends at Tromso, Norway.

United Nations

Sept. 12—Secretary General Kurt Waldheim places the issue of terrorism on the agenda of the upcoming General Assembly.

Sept. 19—The United Nations General Assembly convenes for its 27th annual session under tight security controls because of numerous terrorist threats to delegates.

Stanislaw Trepczynski of Poland becomes the new President of the General Assembly.

Sept. 20—Secretary General Waldheim proclaims 1974 as World Population Year and announces plans for a major population conference at that time.

Sept. 22—The General Assembly's General Committee votes 15 to 7, with the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia

abstaining, to place terrorism on the agenda of the General Assembly.

Sept. 23—The General Assembly defeats an attempt to place the peaceful reunification of Korea on its agenda by 70 to 35 with 21 abstentions.

Sept. 25—U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers asks the U.N. to convene a meeting early next year to act on terrorism.

Secretary General Waldheim names Alfred M. Escher of Switzerland as his representative in dealing with matters affecting Namibia (South-West Africa).

Sept. 26—Speaking before the General Assembly, U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko condemns "the acts of terrorism committed by certain elements from among the participants in the Palestinian movement which have led, notably, to the recent tragic events in Munich."

Sept. 27—The General Assembly is asked by British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home to try to delay the expulsion of Asians from Uganda. He asks the U.N. to call upon Ugandan President Major General Idi Amin to extend "his . . . deadline of 90 days, and to allow the Asians expelled to take their belongings with them."

War in Indochina

Sept. 1—Premier Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam makes a major speech in which he states that the only political settlement acceptable to Hanoi and its Vietcong allies is a 3-part coalition government.

Sept. 3—A 3-day battle between North and South Vietnamese forces, 37 miles north of Saigon, with heavy casualties on both sides, ends in the withdrawal of the North Vietnamese forces.

Sept. 4—The U.S. Air Force reports that its jets, striking from stations in Thailand, destroyed the big North Vietnamese airbase of Phucyen, 10 miles north of Hanoi, yesterday, and shot down a North Vietnamese MIG-19.

Sept. 5—The Saigon command reports the loss of a base camp at Leminh, near the Cambodian border in the Central Highlands; retreating South Vietnamese forces are attempting to fall back on Pleiku, 24 miles to the east.

Sept. 6—The decree abolishing democratic election of officials in the hamlets of South Vietnam, announced on August 22, is put into effect, ending 6 years of popular election at the hamlet level.

Sept. 7—Field reports say that North Vietnamese attacks only 7 miles from Pleiku were beaten back yesterday.

Sept. 9—According to reports from Saigon, its troops abandoned the district capital of Tienphuoc yesterday in the wake of a tank-led attack by the North Vietnamese.

Sept. 10—In the ground attack closest to Danang in

over a year, a Vietcong force attacks a large refugee camp on the outskirts of the city, according to reports from Saigon.

Sept. 11—Two large South Vietnamese airbases, the Tansonnhut field in Saigon's immediate neighborhood and Bienhoa base, 15 miles to the northeast, are subject to a heavy attack with projectiles by the North Vietnamese.

Sept. 12—The U.S. command reports that on September 10 its jets destroyed 3 Longbien Bridge spans and damaged 3 others in downtown Hanoi; the bridge is the main link between Hanoi and supply lines in China.

The Air Force also reports raids on military installations near Hanoi for the first time since April 6 and heavy bombing of targets in South Vietnam.

Sept. 15—American sources in Saigon report that South Vietnamese marines have recaptured the Quangtri Citadel and 90 per cent of the surrounding town.

Sept. 17—Hanoi releases 3 U.S. prisoner of war pilots in a ceremony today in Hanoi. They will remain with the American antiwar activist groups who arranged their release until arrangements for their return are made.

Sept. 18—Heavy fighting is reported south of Danang, where North Vietnamese forces are threatening 3 towns.

Sept. 19—The U.S. command reports that B-52 bombers have attacked North Vietnamese staging areas near Danang.

Sept. 20—A U.S. military spokesman reports that despite South Vietnamese reinforcements and heavy losses, the North Vietnamese forces are continuing to make gains in the fighting south of Danang in the coastal Quangngai Province.

The U.S. Air Force discloses that its planes have been mining the rivers in South Vietnam just below the DMZ to prevent North Vietnamese supply movement by boat to Quangtri Province.

Sept. 22—The U.S. command reports that for the first time since March, 1965, there were no American combat deaths in a week's period, September 10-16.

The South Vietnam command reports that government outposts east and west of Quangngai city have been abandoned after strong North Vietnamese attacks.

The U.S. Air Force announces that its jets flew 280 strikes across North Vietnam on September 21.

Hoang Tung, editor of the North Vietnamese newspaper *Nhan Dan*, says that his country is preparing for 4 more years of war.

Sept. 23—The Cambodian command in Phnompenh reports that Communist troops have fought their way into Chambak, 25 miles southwest of Phnompenh.

Sept. 25—North Vietnamese forces led by tanks are renewing attacks below Danang, according to reports from Saigon.

Sept. 26—The 3 American pilots released by North Vietnam arrive in Peking on their way to the U.S.

Sept. 27—The U.S. command reports that its planes flew more than 300 strikes against North Vietnam today. The planes resume attacks near Hanoi.

U.S. B-52's are diverted from South Vietnamese targets to fly missions against North Vietnamese bases in eastern Cambodia.

Sept. 28—The 3 U.S. pilots released by North Vietnam land in the U.S. with their escort of antiwar activists.

Sept. 30—U.S. fighter bombers strike against North Vietnamese air bases in what is described as the heaviest blow to date against North Vietnamese aircraft on the ground. F-111 swing-wing fighters return to combat for the first time since 1968, participating in raids for the 2nd day.

AUSTRALIA

Sept. 26—Strong new curbs on foreign control of Australian industries are announced by Prime Minister William McMahon.

Sept. 27—Wheat Board Chairman John Cass announces that Australia has sold one million tons of wheat (\$78-million worth) to China.

BANGLADESH

Sept. 14—Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman refuses to meet with Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto until Pakistan has extended diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh.

BRAZIL

Sept. 20—The military government halts the publication of 2 important newspapers in southern Brazil.

Sept. 23—It is reported in Rio de Janeiro that the government has guaranteed to protect 2 primitive Indian tribes against white prospectors and settlers.

Deputy Oscar Pedroso Horta, leader of the official opposition party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement, protests sharply against the ban on political discussion of the presidential candidates for the 1974 elections; the government has banned discussion as "premature."

Sept. 25—The government-censored press reports that the armed forces have begun a drive against guerrillas in a remote Amazon jungle in the central state of Goiás.

Sept. 27—An army spokesman says that the September 25 report of military operations against guerrillas is "exaggerated" and "confused"; "there is no guerrilla warfare in Brazil."

BRAZZAVILLE

Sept. 22—The government announces a series of

anti-French measures, including Brazzaville's withdrawal from the Organization of French-speaking African Nations.

CAMBODIA

Sept. 2—Voting is light in the first National Assembly elections in 6 years.

Sept. 8—In Phnompenh, crowds riot to protest the acute shortage of rice.

Sept. 9—The U.S. State Department declares that the U.S. is getting ready to fly rice supplies from Saigon to Phnompenh, where an acute rice shortage is caused by the action of Communist troops, which have cut all except one of the major highways into the capital.

Sept. 28—The pro-government Social Republican party wins 96.19 per cent of the vote and 32 seats in the upper house of Parliament.

CANADA

Sept. 1—Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau issues an election call after an emergency session of Parliament orders 3,200 striking longshoremen back to work. The general election, which will be held October 30, could have been postponed until June, 1973, but Trudeau chose not to risk a last-minute and possibly ill-timed election call.

CHILE

Sept. 2—Police officials reveal that 154 people were arrested as rival political organizations fought in the streets of Santiago last evening.

Sept. 5—In a strategy speech to leaders of his coalition, President Salvador Allende Gossens promises to hold regular elections and rejects the possibility of civil war.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

(See also *Japan*)

Sept. 6—*Hsinhua*, the Chinese press agency, reports that Premier Chou En-lai has met with the Thai "adviser" to the Thai table tennis team now visiting Peking.

Sept. 10—In Peking, diplomatic sources report that the government yesterday signed a contract for 10 American-built Boeing-707 airliners at a reported cost of \$150 million. Export licenses for the sale were issued by the U.S. in July, 1972.

Sept. 14—The purchase of more than half a million tons of U.S. wheat by China is confirmed in New York by the Louis Dréyfus Corporation.

Sept. 28—After 4 days of conferences, including a 90-minute talk between Japan's Premier Kakuei Tanaka and Chairman Mao Tse-tung, it is announced that China and Japan will end the state of war between them (dating back to 1937) and will reopen diplomatic relations.

Sept. 29—A joint Sino-Japanese statement is issued on the agreement to normalize relations between China and Japan.

DENMARK

Sept. 26—Premier Jens Otto Krag predicts that Denmark will approve Danish membership in the European Common Market.

EGYPT

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Sept. 18—After 3 days of discussions in Tripoli, President Anwar Sadat and Libyan Head of State Muammar el-Qaddafi agree to make Cairo the capital of the projected united state. It is also agreed that there will be a single President popularly elected, a single government and a single political party in the new state. This agreement marks the first step toward the gradual unification of Egypt and Libya, as agreed on August 2. (See "*Egypt*," *Current History*, October, 1972, p. 189.)

FINLAND

Sept. 4—President Urho Kekkonen names a 4-party coalition government to succeed the Social Democratic minority government which resigned July 19. The new Premier is Kalevi Sorsa, a Social Democrat who served as Foreign Minister in the last Cabinet.

FRANCE

Sept. 8—It is reported by *The New York Times* that in a letter to *Le Monde*, Gabriel Aranda, former press spokesman for the Ministry of Public Works, has charged that he has photocopies of 136 documents proving that 48 public figures have participated in illegal or improper deals.

Sept. 21—President Georges Pompidou, in a semi-annual press conference, defends his policies and scoffs at the charges made by Aranda.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC (West)

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Sept. 11—Hundreds of Arab travelers are delayed during security checks at German airports as authorities search for those linked to the massacre of Israeli athletes at the Olympic Games in Munich.

The Bavarian State Interior Ministry estimates that about 60,000 Arabs are legally resident in West Germany and that there are about 10,000 Arabs living there illegally.

Sept. 14—The governments of Poland and West Germany agree to establish embassies in one another's capitals.

Sept. 22—Chancellor Willy Brandt loses a vote of confidence, 233-248. This deliberate tactic forces

an early election in the hope of ending the 5-month parliamentary impasse which stems from opposition to Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. (See "*Germany*," *Current History*, June, 1972, p. 314.)

ICELAND

Sept. 1—The government extends the fishing limit from 12 to 50 miles offshore, despite British and West German protests.

INDIA

Sept. 4—A Defense Ministry statement reveals that India and Pakistan have not yet reached agreement on drawing a new cease-fire line in Kashmir, although they agreed to draw the line by September 4.

Sept. 19—An agreement signed in Moscow calls for an intergovernmental joint commission to support Soviet-Indian cooperation in trade and economic projects and in scientific and technical research.

ISRAEL

(See *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

ITALY

Sept. 28—Half a million chemical industry workers mount a 1-day walkout; yesterday 1.5 million building trade workers staged a 24-hour strike. Hospital doctors and nurses are also on strike.

JAPAN

(See also *China*)

Sept. 19—At the close of a 4-day visit to Tokyo, British Prime Minister Edward Heath warns the Japanese to balance their trade with Britain and other European nations or face protectionist measures by the European community.

A special envoy sent to Taipei by Premier Kakuei Tanaka ends a 3-day visit with no apparent success in his effort to persuade the government of Taiwan to soften its opposition to Japan's plan to recognize the People's Republic of China.

Some 44 people, many of them police, are injured during a riot of some 6,000 students in front of a U.S. Army supply depot in Yokohama.

Sept. 25—Premier Tanaka flies to Peking. Speaking at a banquet, at the end of the first day of his visit, he apologizes for Japan's past aggression.

KOREA, PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

(See *Korea, South*)

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

Sept. 14—It is reported in Seoul that President Park Chung Hee has agreed to delay his planned withdrawal of all 37,000 South Korean troops from

South Vietnam at the request of the U.S., in return for a promise by U.S. President Richard Nixon to keep U.S. ground combat troops in South Korea at least until mid-1973. Previous plans for the withdrawal of South Korean troops were postponed at the request of Saigon.

LEBANON

(See also *Intl. Middle East Crisis*)

Sept. 25—Premier Saab Salam announces that Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon have agreed to "avoid any harm to Lebanon" with regard to Israel.

NORWAY

Sept. 25—In a 2-day national referendum, voters reject membership in the European Economic Community, voting 52.7 per cent against entry.

Sept. 27—Premier Trygve Bratteli says that he and his Labor Cabinet will resign October 6, because of the referendum rejecting membership in the E.E.C. He favored membership.

PAKISTAN

(See *India*)

PANAMA

Sept. 11—The 505-member Assembly of Community Representatives votes to refuse the \$1.93 million paid annually by the U.S. for use of the Panama Canal Zone. Panama and the U.S. are currently negotiating a new canal treaty; jurisdiction of the Canal Zone is a major issue.

PERU

Sept. 26—The military government decrees a halt of indefinite duration to all exports of fish meal and fish oil beginning October 1, in the face of Peru's worst fishing crisis.

PHILIPPINES

Sept. 23—In the wake of an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, martial law is proclaimed.

President Ferdinand E. Marcos imposes a curfew and announces the mass arrest of "Communist conspirators," censorship, and a ban on Filipino travel abroad.

Sept. 24—Marcos orders the military to seize 3 Philippine airlines and all major utilities.

Sept. 25—The government makes public a list of 49 who are being detained, including 6 Congressmen, 2 provincial governors and several newsmen.

In Washington, a Philippine Cabinet member says that martial law will be maintained as long as 2 years so that the government can control subversion and enact social reform measures.

Sept. 26—In a broadcast, Marcos announces a broad land reform program.

Sept. 27—Marcos enlarges the scope of arrests of those charged with "having given aid . . . in the conspiracy to seize . . . state power." 19 new categories of persons are subject to detention.

Sept. 28—More political arrests are made; strict news media censorship is established.

SINGAPORE

Sept. 2—Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's People's Action party is reelected for 5 years; it has been in power since 1965. Fifty-seven parliamentary seats were contested in the general election.

SPAIN

Sept. 12—The newspaper *Informaciones* reports that the rectors of Madrid's 2 state universities have resigned to protest the government order suspending their autonomy.

Sept. 13—In Paris, representatives of Spain and the Soviet Union sign a commercial agreement; this is the first major treaty between the 2 powers since the Spanish Civil War ended in 1939.

SWITZERLAND

Sept. 24—By a margin of less than 9,000 votes, voters reject a constitutional amendment that would have imposed an absolute ban on arms exports and stronger controls over the Swiss arms industry.

SYRIA

Sept. 13—It is reported in Washington that Syria and the Soviet Union have agreed to a security arrangement allowing the Soviets to improve naval facilities at 2 Syrian ports in exchange for a Soviet supply of jet fighter planes and advanced air defense missiles.

TANZANIA

(See *Uganda*)

UGANDA

Sept. 13—An official statement discloses that the government plans to intern on November 8 any of the 55,000 Asians who have been ordered to leave the country by that date.

Sept. 17—The Uganda radio announces that 1,000 Tanzanian troops have invaded Uganda. The Tanzanian radio reports that a "people's army" is marching to overthrow Major General Idi Amin, President of Uganda.

Sept. 20—Amin's forces appear to have defeated the invaders, reported as exiles who tried to overthrow him.

Sept. 26—Somalian Foreign Minister Omar Arteh declares that Uganda and Tanzania have agreed to a 5-point peace plan; a cease-fire is in operation.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 9—The party newspaper *Pravda* discloses that the bread supply to a number of towns east of Moscow has been halted because of poor organization of bakery operations.

"Well-placed officials" in Washington are quoted as reporting that 3 Soviet mechanized divisions have recently been added to the troops on the Sino-Soviet border; there are now 49 divisions in the area, almost one-third of the Soviet Army.

Sept. 12—Strict new laws on the treatment of drug addicts are published.

Sept. 25—The trial of 8 Lithuanians charged with hooliganism opens; the charges stem from rioting in May, 1972.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Japan*)

Sept. 20—A report issued by an unofficial committee chaired by the Earl of Longford recommends stricter laws against pornography and a new legal definition of obscenity.

Sept. 27—Trade union leaders refuse Heath's suggestion of yesterday for a program of voluntary wage and price restraints.

Northern Ireland

Sept. 5—The Unionist party, representing the Protestant majority of the province, suggests a plan to give the Roman Catholic minority a larger voice in government.

Sept. 21—William Whitelaw, administrator of Ulster, announces that the policy of interning suspected terrorists without trial in Northern Ireland is ended; a special court will be established to hear cases of suspected terrorism.

Sept. 22—Roman Catholic leaders denounce the new plan for handling suspected terrorists as "another form of internment."

Sept. 27—A 3-day conference in Darlington, England, on Northern Ireland's political future ends; representatives of the Catholic minority of Northern Ireland boycotted the conference.

The Bahamas

Sept. 19—Prime Minister Lynden O. Pindling is re-elected. Pindling and his Progressive Liberal party plan to secede from Britain in the summer of 1973.

UNITED STATES

Economy

Sept. 1—The Labor Department reports that the country's unemployment rate for August remained

"essentially unchanged"; the rate is 5.6 per cent. Sept. 8—The August, 1972, increase in the wholesale price index has brought the index to a point 4.4 per cent above the level of August, 1971, when controls on wages and prices were imposed, compared to a 4 per cent increase in the August-to-August period of 1970-1971, says the Labor Department. It reports also that "the larger advance in the latest 12 months was due to an acceleration in prices of raw and processed agricultural products."

Sept. 18—The Federal Reserve Board says that industrial production rose 0.5 per cent in August and was 8.2 per cent higher than August, 1971.

Sept. 22—The Labor Department says consumer prices rose 0.2 per cent in August. August consumer prices were 2.9 per cent higher than August, 1971. This is deemed encouragingly moderate inflation.

Foreign Policy

(See also *China, U.S., Government*)

Sept. 1—President Richard M. Nixon and Premier Kakui Tanaka of Japan announce that the Japanese are to buy \$1.1-billion worth of American goods in an attempt to reduce the expected \$3.8-billion trade imbalance between the two countries in 1972.

Sept. 2—With the arrival of six American destroyers, Athens, Greece, becomes the United States Navy's largest home port in the Mediterranean.

Sept. 7—State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray, 3d, says the United States was neither consulted nor informed about South Vietnam's decision to eliminate the popular election of officials in the countryside hamlets.

Sept. 10—Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser, arrives in Moscow.

Sept. 13—The United States agrees to help Rumania finance offshore oil drilling in the Black Sea.

Quoting a Soviet source, *The New York Times* says that Kissinger and the Soviet leadership have reached an understanding concerning Moscow's outstanding World War II debt. This is considered an important preliminary to an overall Soviet-American trade agreement.

Sept. 21—The United States and the Soviet Union agree to 30 joint environmental projects.

Sept. 25—At the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in Washington, D.C., President Nixon says the United States will be "in the forefront" of an attempt to achieve reform of the international monetary system.

Sept. 27—Ronald L. Ziegler, White House press secretary, denies widespread rumors that Kissinger has reached an accord with the North Vietnamese in Paris.

Government

Sept. 5—President Nixon says "extra security mea-

tures" will be taken by the United States to protect American citizens and visiting Israelis from attacks by Palestinian guerrillas.

Congress returns from an 18-day recess.

Sept. 10—The Subversive Activities Control Board concludes that 33 groups on the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations no longer exist.

Sept. 13—Secretary of the Interior Rogers C. B. Morton sets aside 79.2 million acres of federal land in Alaska for possible public uses as designated by Congress.

Sept. 15—The Department of Agriculture admits that Charles W. Pence, the department's director of the Grains Division-Export Marketing Service, gave the 6 major companies selling wheat to the Soviet Union 24 hours' advance notice of a change in the administration's policy on export subsidies (equalization payments) on exported wheat. The department denies the charge that this notification enabled the exporters to reap windfall profits of almost \$92 million. The \$750-million wheat agreement was announced July 8.

Sept. 22—The Agriculture Department announces it is eliminating the export subsidy on wheat.

Sept. 26—By a vote of 45 to 42, the Senate defeats the end-the-war amendment that it had passed two months ago.

Sept. 27—President Nixon signs a \$20.9-billion military weapons authorization bill. It is \$2.3 billion less than he requested.

Sept. 30—President Nixon signs the congressional resolution approving a 5-year freeze by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on most offensive nuclear weapons. The resolution passed in the House in August and in the Senate on September 14. It is known as the SALT "interim agreement."

Military

Sept. 12—*The New York Times* reports that Lieutenant General John D. Lavelle has told the Senate Armed Services Committee that he received permission from General Creighton W. Abrams and Admiral Thomas H. Moorer before ordering air attacks on North Vietnamese airfields in November, 1971. (See "U.S., Military," in *Current History*, August, 1972, p. 96.)

Sept. 13—General Abrams denies that he gave permission to General Lavelle to make unauthorized air raids. Admiral Moorer has denied any knowledge of these raids, according to *The New York Times*. The committee has delayed General Abrams' confirmation as Army Chief of Staff pending the outcome of these hearings.

Politics

Sept. 5—John N. Mitchell, former director of Pres-

ident Nixon's reelection campaign, repeats his denial of any advance knowledge of the June 17, 1972, break-in at the Democratic national headquarters in Washington, D.C. (See also "U.S., Politics," *Current History*, October, 1972, p. 192.)

Sept. 12—Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.) joins Democratic presidential candidate Senator George S. McGovern (D., S.D.) at the start of a 9-city campaign tour of the Middle West and East.

Mayor Richard J. Daley makes 2 appearances with Senator McGovern in Chicago, Illinois.

Sept. 15—Seven men, including two former White House aides, are indicted by a federal grand jury on charges of conspiring to break into Democratic national headquarters in the Watergate building complex, Washington, D.C., on June 17, 1972.

Sept. 16—President Nixon discloses that his net worth is \$765,118.

Sept. 26—Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D., Minn.) campaigns for Senator McGovern in California.

URUGUAY

Sept. 1—In Montevideo, the leader of the Tupamaro guerrilla movement is seized by police after he is shot; his condition is described as "critical"; 2 other guerrillas are also seized.

VIETNAM, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (North)

(See *Intl. War in Indochina*)

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)

(See also *Intl. War in Indochina*)

Sept. 15—14 daily newspapers and 15 other periodicals are permanently closed for failure to post the large bonds demanded by President Nguyen Van Thieu August 4. The bonds, the equivalent of \$47,000, are guarantees against possible fines for violations of the press code.

Sept. 22—The September 20 issue of the opposition daily *Dai Dan Toc* is seized by the government; its editors charge that it was confiscated for printing an *Agence France-Presse* dispatch on U.S. air support in the battles of Quangtri province. Newspapers are permitted to print only that foreign news provided by the government press service. *Dai Dan Toc* also faces possible prosecution which may lead to large fines and prison terms.

Sept. 23—For printing a report on a Cornell University study on American bombing in Indochina, a military tribunal finds the Saigon daily *Dien Tin* guilty of having damaged national security. The newspaper's business manager is sentenced to a year's imprisonment; the newspaper is ordered to forfeit 1 million piasters (about \$2,320) from its recently posted 20-million piaster bond.

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